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Thaw: Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CANTOR v. DETROIT EDISON CO.
LAw-Public Utilities-A public utility, acting in accord with certainprovisions of its state-sanctionedtariff, may be
subject to the federal antitrustlaws and may be liable in treble
damages for violation of those laws. 96 S.Ct. 3110 (1976).
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., I the United States Supreme
Court faced the issue whether a public utility company violates
the Sherman Act 2 by engaging in anticompetitive conduct sancANTITRUST

tioned under a state-approved tariff.3 In so doing, the Court

raised a question that it had virtually ignored since 1943 when it
decided Parker v. Brown.4 In Parker the Court determined that
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to "state action,"' defining "state action" to include private acts compelled
by a state acting as sovereign. Since that landmark case, litigation in this area of the law has centered on determining whether
1. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. A tariff is "a listing or scale of rates or charges for. . . a public utility." Webster's
Third New InternationalDictionary2341 (1971).
4. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,
361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); United States v. Pacific S.W.
Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973). But see
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formulafor NarrowingParkerv. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 7374 & n.13 (1974).
5. The construction is properly phrased as one of the inapplicability of, rather than
immunity from, the Sherman Act. Though the term "immunity" is recognized by most
courts as being imprecise in this context, these same courts continue to use the term. See,
e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F:2d 1277, 1279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1975); New Mexico v.
American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 371 n.18 (9th Cir. 1974); Ladue Local Lines, Inc.
v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 135-36 (8th Cir. 1970).
While the decision in Parkerdealt with the validity of the California prorate program
under the Sherman Act, there is no indication that the scope of the decision does not
encompass the other federal antitrust laws. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328, 330 n.13 (1975); see New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
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allegedly anticompetitive conduct of a regulated party is state
action.In Cantor four Justices limited the concept of "state action"
to state officials acting pursuant to legislative command.7 When
the defendant is a state-regulated private party, these four
Justices would apply a case-by-case approach to the problem of
determining the applicability of the federal antitrust laws.' A
fifth Justice conformed Parker to his reading of other cases and
proposed, whether the defendant is a private party or a state
official, that state regulation be subject to substantive examination.' The four remaining Justices reaffirmed the basic tenet of
Parker.'I A majority of the Court was able to agree that a fairness
defense, which left defendant's conduct subject to the antitrust
laws but not to treble damages, may be available under certain
circumstances." However, four of the five Justices who would
consider such a defense would limit it so severely that it would
2
be practically nonexistent.'
The respondent in Cantor, Detroit Edison, was the sole supplier of electricity for about five million people in southeastern
Michigan.' 3 It also supplied its customers with roughly fifty per6. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Duke & Co. v.
Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th
Cir. 1975); New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Business
Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); United States v.
Pacific S.W. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
7. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3117 (1976). The Justices were
Stevens, Brennan, White, and Marshall.
8. Id. at 3123.
9. Justice Blackmun proposed that "state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must
fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits." Id. at 3126 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
10. They were Chief Justice Burger (concurring), id. at 3123 (Burger, J., concurring),
and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist (dissenting), id. at 3139 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11. This majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, and Marshall, id.
at 3121, and Justice Blackmun (concurring), id. at 3128 n.6.
12. They were Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, and Marshall. See notes 63-66 infra
and accompanying text.
13. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3113 (1976). In 1972 Detroit Edison
served 1,573,838 electrical customers. Of these, 1,454,513, or 92%, were residential customers. The figure 5,000,000 is arrived at because several individuals may live in a household
represented by a single customer. Brief for Respondent at 3, 4 n.5.
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cent of the standard-size light bulbs they used most frequently.' 4
Since 1886, respondent or a predecessor had provided new residential customers with light bulbs for all their permanent fixtures; when these light bulbs would burn out, Detroit Edison
would replace them.'5 The customer paid no direct charge for this
service; instead the cost was incorporated into respondent's tariffs.' 6 The Michigan Public Service Commission, which pervasively regulates the distribution of electricity within the state,
approved these tariffs.' 7
Petitioner, Lawrence Cantor, was a retail druggist engaged
in the sale of light bulbs. Cantor claimed that respondent's light
bulb program was anticompetitive and thereby injured him: Petititioner wished to sell light bulbs, but respondent replaced them
without direct charge.' 8 The complaint alleged that respondent
had thus violated the antitrust laws.' 9 Respondent moved for
14. Detroit Edison did not distribute fluorescent lamps or high intensity discharge
lamps. Including those types of bulbs would have reduced respondent's market share to
about 23%. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3113 & n.4 (1976).
15. Id. at 3113. Respondent had 35 customer service centers and approximately 50
agents to distribute its bulbs. Most customers who used the light bulb exchange program
obtained their light bulbs at customer service centers. There were approximately 14 of
the most commonly used light bulb sizes in the program. The bulbs were specially designed and marked, and physical exchange was required to ensure that those not involved
in the program could not take advantage of it. Brief for Respondent at 5-6.
16. Detroit Edison designed its own bulbs and accepted competitive bids to select
the manufacturer. The cost of these bulbs was included as a part of the cost of service to
customers. It was not included as a part of Detroit Edison's rate base though certain
facilities which were involved in the distribution of the bulbs were included in the rate
base. Brief for Respondent at 4 n.7.
In 1972, for a cost of $2,835,000, Detroit Edison provided its residential customers
with 18,564,381 light bulbs. Respondent paid $2,363,328 to its three principal manufacturers of bulbs. The remaining $471,672 went for costs incurred by using personnel and
facilities to service the program. No direct profit on the program was recorded by Detroit
Edison. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3113 & n.8, 3114 (1976).
17. In 1909 the State of Michigan began regulating electric utilities, and in 1916 the
light bulb program as a part of a tariff filed by Detroit Edison was first approved. Since
then, approval of respondent's tariffs had included approval of the light bulb program.
Because many commercial customers used large quantities of fluorescent lighting and
were not as interested in the program, in 1964 the Michigan Public Service Commission
approved respondent's decision to eliminate large commercial customers from the program. Those customers received a general rate reduction. Id. at 3113.
18. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1110-11 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
19. Petitioner's complaint asserted a violation of the Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1970), and of the Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). In his brief in the United States
Supreme Court, petitioner also argued a violation of the Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). The complaint purported to be a class action suit, but no class was certified. The
complaint sought treble damages and an injunction permanently enjoining respondent
from requiring the purchase of bulbs in connection with the sale of electrical energy.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3113 n.3 (1976).
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summary judgment, claiming that it was shielded from liability

because its conduct was completely regulated by the Michigan
Public Service Commission. 0 Since the light bulb program was

required by its state-approved tariff, respondent contended that
the program constituted "state action." Thus, under the doctrine
of Parkerv. Brown,21 respondent should be exempt from the oper-

ation of the antitrust laws. Although the district court22 and the
court of appeals23 accepted this reasoning, the United States Su-

preme Court granted certioraris and reversed.2s
I. ParkerAND THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
A.

Parker
Parkerhas been called "the decision which opened the eyes

of the antitrust bar to the possibilities of avoiding the impact of
the antitrust laws, if only state governmental action is in some

way involved."" During the early 1930's, California was faced
with chaotic economic conditions in certain agricultural areas of

the state. It sought to remedy this situation by imposing the
power of the state on agricultural markets through the California
Agricultural Prorate Act.Y This Act authorized marketing programs for the state's agricultural commodities. These programs
were meant to restrict competition among growers and to maintain the prices of commodities sold to packers. 8
In Parker Porter Brown, a producer and packer of raisins,
20. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See generally
MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6(6) (Supp. 1976).
21. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Many courts have held that the Parkerdoctrine embraces
the rates and practices of state-regulated public utilities. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern
Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1971).
22. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The district
court commented that it did not think a court should step in when a plaintiff had not
first approached the state regulatory commission. Id. at 1112. Other courts have also
deemed an antitrust suit to be a poor substitute for a plaintiff's prompt protest to the state
regulatory commission and a request for an administrative remedy. See, e.g., Business
Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
23. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
24. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
25. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
26. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
27. Ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969 (current version at CAL. AGRic. CODE § 57501 (West

1968)).
28. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943).
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sued to enjoin enforcement of a program for the marketing of the
1940 raisin crop produced in Raisin Proration Zone No. 1.29 Before
disposing of several other issues, the Supreme Court considered
whether this marketing program was invalidated by the Sherman
Act." The Court began its discussion by making two assumptions. First, it assumed that the California prorate program, if it
were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract,
combination, or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate, would violate the Sherman Act. Second, the Court assumed that Congress could prohibit a state from maintaining
such a program because of its effect on interstate commerce. '
The Court noted that Congress could constitutionally subtract
from a state's authority; however, the Court would not lightly
attribute to Congress an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents.3 2 In the Court's view, nothing
in the language or history of the Sherman Act suggested that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.3 Therefore, the Court concluded:
29. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941). The marketing program for
the 1940 raisin crop became effective on September 7, 1940. Brown was a producer and
packer of raisins. He had produced 200 tons and he had contracted to sell 762.5 tons of
1940 crop raisins. Brown had expected to sell, if the program had not been put into effect,
3000 tons of 1940 crop raisins at $60 a ton. After the program became effective, the price
paid to growers rose from $45 a ton to $55 a ton or higher. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
347, 349 (1943).
Brown's claim for relief was founded solely upon the ground that the program
violated the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. He argued that the program
prevented his purchase of raisins in open market for later shipment in interstate commerce. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Cal. 1941). His petition for an injunction against the enforcement of the raisin prorate program was granted. The state officials
took an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
30. The United States Supreme Court also found the program valid under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601624 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), and the commerce clause. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). It has been suggested that one of the underlying rationales of Parkerwas that the
state's prorate program was consonant with the aims of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing
Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 71, 86-87 (1974). If that is true, it seems strange that
the Court in Parker explicitly mentioned this consistency between state and federal agricultural policies in upholding the California act's validity against the other two challenges
but did not mention this consistency in conjunction with the Sherman Act issue with
which it first dealt. See generally Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust
Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine,43 U. CiN. L. REv. 61, 65-66 (1974);
Note, Parkerv. Brown: A PreemptionAnalysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1174 n.62 (1975).
31. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
32. Id. at 351. See also New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
33. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159
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The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,
344-45; cf. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910.11

Parkerthus established the principle that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to apply to a state's actions. 5 This raises
the question of what constitutes the acts of a state. There are two
different tests for determining state action. In one, the identity
of the party is determinative-the Sherman Act is inapplicable
to the acts of the state and of state officials. In the other, adopted
by Parker,the activity is the focus of attention-the Sherman Act
is inapplicable to those acts which are compelled by a state acting
as sovereign regardless of the actor's identity.
B.

The Philosophy that ParkerAdopted from EarlierDecisions

Lowenstein v. Evans" and Olsen v. Smith,3 cited in the
Parker decision,s are important for an understanding of Parker.
In Lowenstein state officials, who had enforced a South Carolina
(1942), the Court decided that a state may maintain a suit for damages under the Sherman Act. This decision was based not upon a literal interpretation of the word "person,"
but rather upon the fact that the Court could perceive no reason why Congress would want
to leave a state without a remedy when it is the victim of a Sherman Act violation, See
New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (Evans used a
functional methodology to give states the right to sue for treble damages).
34. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
35. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 136 (1961); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Gas Light Co.
v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
In Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd per euriam, 353
U.S. 919 (1957), a three-judge district court found a state licensing statute to be valid
although it was contended that the statute was in contravention of the state and federal
constitutions as well as the federal antitrust laws. The court stated that "the anti-trust
laws deal with individual activity and not with State activity." Id. at 902. It cited Parker
to support this proposition. The United States Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.
Hitchcock v.. Collenberg, 353 U.S. 919 (1957). It cited several cases that had held that
states have this licensing power. It is arguable that the Court accepted the proposition
that state statutes which are otherwise valid are not affected by the federal antitrust laws.
36. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
37. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
38. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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statute which created a state liquor monopoly, were sued for violating the antitrust laws. Parker specifically cited a single page
of the two-and-one-half page opinion. 9 This is significant in that
the cited page limited its discussion to the fact that the monopoly
had been created by a state statute." The following page discussed the issue "whether, in declaring and asserting this monopoly in herself, and in assuming and controlling its enforcement,
the state comes within the provisions of the act of congress of
1890."' 1 This following page, however, was not cited by the Parker
Court.
Parkercited the initial discussion in Lowenstein for the proposition that a state legislatively may create a monopoly. The
subsequent reasoning in Lowenstein was omitted to show that the
decision in Parker was not limited to a finding that the Sherman
Act did not apply to the states. By its citation, Parker indicated
that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to the instruments used
by the state.
In Olsen v. Smith,42 the duly licensed state pilots of the port
of Galveston, Texas, brought suit to enjoin an unlicensed individual from offering his services as a pilot. The defendant claimed
that the pilotage laws of Texas were in conflict with the Sherman
Act because "the commissioned pilots have a monopoly of the
business, and by combination among themselves exclude all others from rendering pilotage services. 43 The Court recognized that
this contention was, in essence, a denial of the state's power to
regulate:
[S]ince if the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing
to appoint and commission, those who are to perform pilotage
services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a
legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized
39. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). This seemingly insignificant point
becomes important when it is considered that, in the same citation sentence, the citation
to Olsen was to both pages of its Sherman Act discussion. It appears, therefore, that the
Parker Court had a reason for citing to only one page in the Lowenstein opinion.
40. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). The monopoly was given
to the state which received all the profits to be used for public purposes. This appears to
be the reason the ParkerCourt used the signal "cf." This signal is used to indicate support
from a different but analogous proposition. A UNiFORM SYSTEM OF CrrAboN rule 2:3, at 7
(12th ed. 1976).
41. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
42. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
43. Id. at 344-45.
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agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law."
Therefore, if the defendant sought relief from the pilotage
laws:
[T]he remedy is in Congress, in whom the ultimate authority
on the subject is vested, and cannot be judicially afforded by
denying the power of the State to exercise its authority over a
subject concerning which it has plenary power until Congress
has seen fit to act in the premises. 5
Olsen found that "no monopoly or combination in a legal
sense" could arise from a state-granted monopoly in its "duly
authorized agents." The state in Olsen had "the power to regulate
• . . those who are to perform. . . services" and by so regulating
had made licensed pilots the duly authorized agents of the state.
Hence, the Court in Olsen found that Congress had not intended
to extend the reach of the Sherman Act to state-regulated conduct. Parker reaffirmed this finding: "We find nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature."4 Parker drew from Olsen
the idea that not only acts of state officials but also stateregulated acts of private parties are acts of the state.
The principles of Lowenstein and Olsen form the foundation
of the Parker rationale that the Sherman Act was not intended
by Congress to be applicable to the anticompetitive acts of a
state. A state commands state officials and private parties
through statutes and other means; these state commands are
exempt from the Sherman Act. State officials and private parties
compelled to perform certain anticompetitive acts are exempt
because their acts are the acts of the state.

I1. Cantor: THE READING OF Parker
In Cantoreight members of the Court addressed the question
of Parker's relevance.17 The plurality limited Parker to its
"narrow holding": "The Court [in Parker] held that even though
44. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (emphasis added).
47. Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, and Marshall addressed this question in the
Court's opinion. 96 S. Ct. at 3117. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger addressed the question
in his concurrence, id. at 3123, as did Justice Stewart in his dissent in which Justices
Powell and Rehnquist joined, id. at 3128 passim.
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comparable programs organized by private persons would be illegal, the action taken by state officials pursuant to express legisla4
tive command did not violate the Sherman Act." " Consequently,
the plurality disregarded the rationale of Parker and limited the
Sherman Act exemption for "state action" solely to action taken
by state officials.49 Therefore, the plurality in Cantor found that
Parker was not relevant to the applicability of the federal anti9
trust laws to private conduct required by state lawA
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the dissent that Parker
should be read to exempt from the Sherman Act private conduct
which is required by the state acting as a sovereign. Chief Justice
Burger differed with the dissent, however, as to whether the stateregulated scheme in Cantorwas the result of the state's sovereign
will. He believed that Michigan had formed no state policy with
respect to whether a utility should have a light bulb program like
Detroit Edison's. The Chief Justice concluded that approval of
the program by the Michigan Public Service Commission did not
implement any statewide policy.- The dissent disagreed, finding
that Michigan's policy was not neutral with respect to whether a
utility should have had such a plan; rather, the Commission's
approval of Detroit Edison's tariff expressed a state policy in
favor of the light bulb program.52
48. Id. at 3116.
49. Id. at 3117 & n.24. This is consonant with the decision in E. W. Wiggins Airways,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
But even in that case, those dealing with the state were exempted from the federal
antitrust acts. This was done in order to avoid frustrating the state's intent.
It should be noted that even when the action is taken by a state official, it must be
taken as an act of government. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943). If the state
officials join in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, they cannot claim
that the Sherman Act is inapplicable to such activity. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
50. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3117 (1976).
51. Id. at 3123-24 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Since in Chief Justice Burger's view the
state's policy was neutral with respect to the light bulb practice, the Commission's approval, even though it required Detroit Edison to maintain the program, was not the act
of a sovereign. Cf. Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (Parkerdoes not
protect governmental defendants without demonstration that state intent was to restrain
competition in a given area); New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th
Cir. 1974) (if the defendant is not the state, legislature must declare its intent to supplant
competition in an industry); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,
424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (for valid governmental action to
confer antitrust immunity, the government must have determined that competition is not
the best method of regulating an area of the economy). See generally Comment, Antitrust
Immunity-Reevaluation & Synthesis of Parker v. Brown-Intent, State Action,
Causation, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1245 (1973).
52. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3134 n.11, 3139 & n.26 (1976)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The interpretation given to Parkerby Chief Justice Burger
and the dissent comports with the approach adopted in 1975 by
the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar. 3 In Goldfarb the Court, addressing the scope of the Parker
doctrine, observed that "[t]he threshold inquiry in determining
if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is
required by the State acting as sovereign."54 Goldfarb indicated
that the activity, not the actor, is the essential determinant: if the
activity is compelled by a state acting as sovereign, the actors are
exempt from the Sherman Act.
Ill. Cantor: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Both the plurality and Chief Justice Burger, despite the use
of different approaches, concluded that the Parker"state action"
exemption was inapplicable to the facts of Cantor.The next question was whether Detroit Edison should be exempt from liability
for the program. Chief Justice Burger joined in this part of the
plurality opinion to form a majority, which recognized two possible reasons why private conduct required by state law should be
exempt from the antitrust laws. First, it would be unfair to conclude that a private party who merely has obeyed the state's
sovereign command thereby has violated federal law. Second,
where the state already regulates an area of the economy, Congress may not have intended to superimpose the antitrust laws,
an additional and perhaps conflicting regulatory mechanism. 5
The FairnessProblem
The Justices in the majority first addressed the argument
that it would be unjust to impose liability for violation of a federal
law upon a private party for merely obeying the command of a
state sovereign. They observed that this unfairness did not exist
here or, perhaps, in any actual case. A typical case involves a
blend of private and public decisionmaking. 51In Cantor the maA.

53. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
54. Id. at 790. The rationale behind the Parker exemption from the antitrust laws is
that the state government is a sovereign which acts in the public interest. Stroud v.
Benson, 155 F. Supp. 482, 492 (E.D.N.C. 1957), vacated on othergrounds, 254 F.2d 448
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958); Note, Parkerv. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A
New Test for State Action Exemptions, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 286, 289-90 (1973).
55. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3117 (1976).
56. Id. at 3118. As the Cantor majority recognized, in Parker there was significant
private participation in formulating and effectuating the proration program. Id. at 3118
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jority found that the light bulb program was the product of a
decision in which both the regulated party and the regulating
state agency had participated. The majority stated that "[t]here
is nothing unjust in a conclusion that [Detroit Edison's] participation in the decision is sufficiently significant to require that its
conduct implementing the decision, like comparable conduct
by
'57
unregulated businesses, conform to applicable federal law.
The dissent criticized 8 this rationale as being inconsistent
with that of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.,5" where the Court found that no violation of
the Sherman Act could be predicated upon mere attempts to
influence the passage or enforcement of state laws. Two reasons
underlay the decision in Noerr. First, the legislative and executive branches depend upon the people expressing their wishes.
Those with a hope of personal gain furnish much of the information upon which governments act. If these people were forced to
refrain from participating due to fear of Sherman Act liability,
governments would be deprived of a valuable source of information." Second, the right to petition is one of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 1 To abridge this right because of a
petitioner's financial interest would emasculate the guarantee
and raise grave constitutional questions.2
In Cantorthe dissent found that the persuasive reasoning of
Noerr demonstrated that Sherman Act liability should not be
predicated upon Detroit Edison's participation in instituting the
light bulb program. Utility regulation is heavily dependent upon
the participation of the regulated utilities. Such utilities will,
henceforth, withhold their expertise for fear of incurring Sherman
Act liability. 3 The dissent also argued that the majority's position would impair the right to petition. 4
Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurrence suggests a third argument against predicating antitrust liability upon a utility's parn.25. The Parker Court explained that this was just a condition the state imposed upon
the prorate program. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
57. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119 k1976).
58. Id. at 3134 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
60. Id. at 137.
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
62. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961).
63. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3134 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
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ticipation in securing favorable regulation. He noted that every
state enactment is initiated by its beneficiaries." It would
scarcely make sense to immunize only those who are powerful
enough to lobby behind the scenes, and who thus can avoid the
appearance of participation.66
B.

The CongressionalIntent Problem

In Cantor the majority discussed the following rationale for
finding that congressional intent was not to apply the federal
antitrust laws to private conduct prescribed by state law. Antitrust legislation imposes a competitive standard; regulatory agencies impose a public interest standard; since these two standards
are fundamentally inconsistent, the federal antitrust laws should
not be applied in areas of the economy pervasively regulated by
state agencies." The majority found this reasoning unacceptable.
It observed that conduct may be subject to state regulation and
to the federal antitrust laws without having to satisfy inconsistent
standards." Public utility regulation is imposed on the assumption that a public utility is a natural monopoly and requires state
regulation to replace the forces of competition. 9 Therefore, the
state's regulation of the utility's distribution of electricity was not
necessarily inconsistent with federal regulation of the utility's
activities in competitive areas, such as the light bulb market.'"
The Justices of the majority would not permit the federal
interest in competition in the light bulb market inevitably to be
subordinated to the state's interest in regulating its utility's distribution of electricity. They reasoned that Congress could
65. Id. at 3126 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
66. Id. Mr. Justice Blackmun was discussing whether the Sherman Act's effect on a
state-sanctioned scheme should depend on who initiated the scheme-private actors or
the state.
67. Id. at 3119.
68. Id. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); cf. Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (federal regulation).
69. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119 (1976); see generally Note,
Regulation, Competition, and YoUr Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. Rav. 785, 787;
Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1175 (1975). For a
contrary view, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion observed that while costs of initiating electric service are substantial, the rewards might be high enough to encourage competition. But the state has reduced profit margins by regulating public utilities and therefore
there is less private competition and less pressure for state ownership of such utilities. In
other words, there may be no such thing as a natural monopoly.
70. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119-20 (1976).
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scarcely have intended state regulatory agencies to have broader
power than federal regulatory agencies to exempt private conduct
from the antitrust laws. Assuming state regulation could exempt
private conduct, it could do so only when exemption is necessary
to make the state regulation effective.7 1 In Cantorthe light bulb
program was not exempted because, in the majority's opinion, 7it2
was not essential to Michigan's regulation of its electric utilities.
The majority reasoned that even if it assumed it was not Congress's intent for the antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy primarily regulated by a state, that assumption would not
have foreclosed the enforcement of the antitrust laws in an essentially unregulated area of the economy such as the market for
electric light bulbs.13 Thus the majority concluded that Detroit
Edison's light bulb program, although required by the terms of
the utility's tariff, was not exempt from the antitrust laws. 4
The dissent criticized the majority's reasoning on three
grounds. First, it dismissed as an abstract proposition the possibility that the majority could find the federal antitrust standards
and the state regulatory standards to be consistent: According to
the dissent, the majority could not find such consistency because
of its assumption that absent state regulation there would have
been an antitrust violation here. 5 Second, the dissent believed
the majority was mistaken in assuming that Congress intended
the standard for exemption to be at least as severe for a state
agency as for a federal agency. 7 The majority erred, in the dissent's view, in failing to recognize that where federal regulation
conflicts with federal antitrust laws, the problem is to reconcile
the inconsistent commands of the same sovereign; where state
regulation conflicts with federal antitrust laws, the state regula71. Id. at 3120. It should be noted that the majority only assumed that the standards
for finding an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for a federal agency's regulations
are the minimum standards for finding an exemption for a state agency's regulations.
Private conduct which is compelled by a regulatory federal agency is exempt from the
federal antitrust laws, in the absence of any other federal law granting an exemption, only
when exemption is necessary to make the federal regulation effective. While it is beyond
the scope of this note to deal with this implied repeal doctrine, a collection of United
States Supreme Court cases on this subject can be found at Annot., 45 L. Ed. 2d 841
(1976).
72. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3120 (1976).
73. Id. at 3119.
74. Id. at 3121.

75. Id. at 3134-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 3135 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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tion must fallY7 Third, the dissent accused the majority of participating in a substantive examination of state regulation. For a
state-regulated utility to be exempt from the Sherman Act, the
state regulation must conform to the assumption that a public
utility is a natural monopoly; in addition, such regulation must
be sufficiently central to the regulation of the utility's natural
78
monopoly powers.

The dissent appears to have confused two types of conflict:
the conflict that may exist between federal antitrust standards
and state regulatory standards, and the conflict that may exist
where state-regulated private conduct violates the federal antitrust laws. In Cantor the majority concluded that Michigan's
regulation of Detroit Edison's distribution of electricity was consistent with the application of antitrust standards to the light
bulb market.7 Furthermore, the majority did not create "a statutory simulacrum of the substantive due process doctrine," as the
dissent suggested. 0 Rather, the majority only assumed that there
were situations in which state regulation would lead to exemption
from the antitrust laws. The majority did not say that state regulatory laws could repeal federal antitrust laws. Instead, it stated
that even if Congress did not intend the federal antitrust laws to
apply to conduct essential to a state's regulation of its utilities,
Cantor does not present such a case. There is no guarantee that
if such a case should arise, the majority would find it exempt from
the federal antitrust laws.
It should be noted that the majority's reasoning did not deal
with invalidating state regulatory measures; it dealt solely with
whether "private conduct required by state law is exempt from
the Sherman Act."8 The majority's opinion left Detroit Edison's
tariff intact but held that Detroit Edison could be found liable
for following such tariff and could be enjoined from following such
tariff. The ramifications of this are, of course, quite plain. If
Detroit Edison is not enjoined from following the state-approved
tariff, state law will continue to compel Detroit Edison to follow
such tariff; furthermore, federal law will continue to impose liability upon Detroit Edison for following such tariff. Detroit Edison will find itself between Scylla and Charybdis.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

3136 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3119-20.
3140 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3117.
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IV. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S APPROACH
A. Preemption and the Rule of Reason
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, adopted an entirely
different approach to the applicability of the Sherman Act to a
state's actions. He viewed the state-approved tariffs, which regulated both the distribution of electricity and the light bulb program, to be state action. Unlike the other Justices, however, he
did not feel state action should be automatically exempt from the
Sherman Act. While the other Justices differed over whether the
light bulb program was state action and therefore was exempt,
Justice Blackmun found the light bulb program to be state action
and then proceeded to examine it substantively. 2
First, he noted that Congress could, if it wished, preempt
those state laws that are inconsistent with the federal policy of
free competition in interstate commerce. The question was thus
one of discerning congressional intent concerning preemption."
Justice Blackmun found that the Sherman Act's legislative history did not address the question. The framers evidently believed
they lacked the power, under the commerce clause, to regulate
economic activity that was within the domain of the states. 84 But
the Court has since held that Congress intended the reach of the
Sherman Act to expand along with that of the commerce power.
Justice Blackmun next considered whether the Sherman Act
should preempt inconsistent state laws. 8 Believing Parker was
but one of three cases in which the Court had faced this problem,
Justice Blackmun contended that the Court had already resolved
this conflict. He believed the Court had, in both Northern Securities Co. v. United States 7 and Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.,8 decided that inconsistent state statutes were
82. Id. at 3126-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 3124 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84. Id. See generally Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing Parkerv. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 84-85 (1974).
85. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3124 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 n.2
(1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974).
86. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3124 (1976) (Blackmun,.J., concurring). See generally Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALF L.J. 1164
(1975). Federal law is given primacy by the supremacy clause of the Constitution, U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. This is to ensure that congressional policy is not defeated by inconsistent state policies.
87. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
88. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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preempted by the Sherman Act. 9 But if the Sherman Act generally preempts inconsistent state laws, the problem is to determine
which laws are preempted and to what extent they are
preempted.
Justice Blackmun's solution was a rule of reason: Statesanctioned anticompetitive activity should be preempted by the
Sherman Act if the activity's potential harms outweigh its benefits. He believed the factor of state sanction attests to the
strength of the justification for the anticompetitive activity."9 He
proposed that anticompetitive state action which interferes with
intrastate competition be subject to the same stringent review
under the Sherman Act as anticompetitive state action which

interferes with interstate competition is subject to under the commerce clause. 9' For Justice Blackmun a particularly strong justification for anticompetitive state action exists where the state
89. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3124-25 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Mr. Justice Blackmun also believed that because Congress had enacted
several laws to exempt various state-sanctioned anticompetitive schemes from the
Sherman Act, it had demonstrated its belief that the Sherman Act preempts inconsistent
state laws. Id. at 3125 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Miller-Tydings Act, ch.
690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1934)); McGuire Bill, ch. 745, 66 Stat.
631 (1952) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)2-5 (1946)); McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
The dissent believed that to the extent congressional action reveals congressional
intent with respect to state regulation of electric service, it is approbative. Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct 3110, 3140 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). "Federal regulation . . . [is) to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the
States." Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1970).
90. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3126 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). In Note, Parkerv. Brown: A PreemptionAnalysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975),
it was argued that state regulation should be subject to a preemption analysis. Initially,
the court would decide if a possible conflict existed between the state regulation and the
federal antitrust laws. Since the federal antitrust laws are not meant to be an exclusive
system of regulation for the economic system, state action would be invalid only if it
interfered with the policies behind those antitrust laws. These policies are to maintain
efficient resource allocation, to ensure fair prices, and to preserve small competitors.
Therefore, when the market prevents simultaneous attainment of all three of these poli.
cies, the state's decision as to which goal to effectuate would not be contrary to the
antitrust laws. Hence it would not be preempted. No state regulation would necessarily
be voided; rather, it would be subject to a rule of reason. Since Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), it has been recognized that the Sherman Act forbids only
restraints of trade or commerce which are unreasonable. See generally Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE LJ.
775 (1965). The factor of state involvement would be considered in applying the rule of
reason.
91. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the stringent review under the
commerce clause, see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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689

seeks the same objectives as the Sherman Act seeks-efficient
resource allocation and low prices.2 Thus, in a market where
competition is ineffective, the state may substitute its own control for the forces of competition: "But ending competition in the
lightbulb market cannot be accepted as an adequate state objective without some evidence-of which there is not the least hint
in this record-that such competition is in some way ineffective.""
Justice Blackmun noted that the decision in Parkerwas entirely consistent with this approach, because it was reasonable for
the State of California to have attempted to stabilize wildly fluctuating agricultural prices. He believed that the identity of the
parties was irrelevant to whether the state-imposed restraint was
preempted. 4 His basic premise, that the Court had already decided that the Sherman Act preempts inconsistent state laws, can
be tested by examining the two cases he relied upon for this
proposition-Northern Securities Co. v. United States95 and
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp."
B. Northern Securities and Schwegmann Brothers
Northern Securities involved an attempt by stockholders of
two competing and parallel railroad lines to place the two systems
under common control. This control was to be placed in a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey. The stockholders
were to receive shares in the holding corporation in return for
their shares in the railroads. The holding corporation was to manage both railroads as if there were a single ownership. The shareholders thus sought to avoid the impact of the antitrust laws
while eliminating the unprofitable forces of competition.97
The United States brought suit under the Sherman Act to
92. Cantor v. Detroit Edison

Co., 96

S. Ct. 3110, 3127 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concur-

ring).
93. Id. at 3128 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Consumers' Sanitary Coffee & Butter
Stores v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 348 Ill. 615, 181 N.E. 411 (1932), the Supreme Court
of Illinois was faced with a challenge to a similar light bulb program approved by the
Illinois Commerce Commission. The court considered the question to be whether an electric rate could include a compulsory charge for light bulbs. The rate was found unlawful
and unreasonable. It gave the electric utility an unlawful monopoly of the light bulb
business to the detriment of other light bulb dealers. Also, it unreasonably compelled
customers, even if they wanted to purchase light bulbs elsewhere, to pay the electric utility
for the light bulbs.
94. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3128 n.5 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
95. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
96. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
97. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 326-27 (1904).
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enjoin the holding corporation from receiving dividends from or
voting the stock of the two railroads." The corporation argued
that it was a state corporation and that, in acquiring the stock of
the railroad corporations, it was acting consistently with the powers conferred by its charter. To grant the relief requested, the
argument continued, would be an unauthorized interference with
New Jersey's sovereign control over its internal commerce. The
Government argued that it was attacking only the combination
which existed among the stockholders of the competing railroads,
and that this combination, through the use of a common corporate trustee, violated the Sherman Act by restraining interstate
00
and international commerce.
The Court reasoned that because of the supremacy clause,"'
the State of New Jersey could not, by chartering the holding
corporation, authorize this combination's objective. 02 Therefore,
Northern Securities stands not for the principle that the Sherman
Act preempts inconsistent state laws, but rather for the principle
for which Parker cited the case, that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." ' 3
In Schwegmann Brothers v. CalvertDistillers Corp., "I plaintiffs were liquor distributors engaged in a price-fixing scheme.
They sought to enjoin the defendant, a New Orleans retailer, from
selling below the minimum prices fixed by the scheme. Louisiana
law permitted this type of price-fixing. The Court noted that
absent congressional approval mere state authorization of such
price-fixing would not immunize the scheme.' 5 Plaintiffs, however, sought this approval in a 1937 amendment to the Sherman
Act.' 6 The Court, based on an analysis of the amendment, found
that there was no congressional approval for the type of pricefixing involved. Therefore, Schwegmann also is based upon the
Parker principle that "a state does not give immunity to those
who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
98. Id. at 355.
99. Id. at 332.
100. Id. at 335.
101. U.S. CorST. art. VI, ci. 2.
102. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345-46 (1904).
103. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
104. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
105. Id. at 386.
106. Id. The amendment was the Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1934)).
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or by declaring that their action is lawful."10 7 The state must
' 8
impose the restraint "as an act of government. 10
V.

THE IMPOSITION OF TREBLE DAMAGES AND CONSIDERATIONS OF

FAIRNESS
The plurality, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun all concluded, although through different approaches,
that the antitrust laws were applicable to the light bulb program.
The plurality and Mr. Chief Justice Burger decided that the program was not "state action" and should not otherwise be exempt
from the antitrust laws. Mr. Justice Blackmun considered the
program to be "state action" but proceeded to examine it substantively, concluding that Detroit Edison's tariff provisions for
the light bulb program were preempted by the Sherman Act.
There still remained the question of the fairness of imposing treble damages for conduct compelled by the provisions of a statesanctioned tariff.
The plurality recognized that fairness might be a defense
against the imposition of treble damages. If the regulation had
increased the likelihood of antitrust violation, or if respondent
had relied upon a justified understanding of immunity, perhaps
such a fairness defense would have been appropriate."' However,
these considerations were found absent by the plurality in
Cantor. The plurality reasoned that since the Michigan Public
Service Commission merely approved the tariff proposed by Detroit Edison, the utility's risk of violating the antitrust laws had
not been increased.110 In essence, the plurality would impose treble damages because the utility rather than the state had proposed the tariff. Predicating such damages upon a utility's participation in regulatory decisionmaking is subject to the same criticism that was leveled at predicating liability, in the first instance,
upon such participation."'
Furthermore, the plurality decided that Detroit Edison could
not justifiably claim that it was led to believe its conduct was
exempt from the antitrust laws. The plurality noted that the
107. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). See Simmons & Fornaciari, State
Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U.
CIN. L. REv. 61, 67 (1974).
108. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
109. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3121 (1976).
110. Id.
111. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
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Court had not previously sustained a claim that otherwise unlawful private conduct was exempt from the antitrust laws because
it had been compelled by state law."' However, several United
States Supreme Court decisions, some previously examined,
strongly suggest this proposition."' Further, many circuit court
decisions have sustained just such claims."' Consequently, it
should be considered that:
In civil cases, unlike criminal cases, it is appropriate to recognize that businessmen must rely upon counsel, who in turn are
guided by the existing precedents in making difficult decisions
on the effect of the antitrust laws on specific business conduct.
In suits for damages in such cases it is particularly appropriate
to be mindful of the injustice
of retroactive imposition of the
5
penalty of treble damages."

Undoubtedly both Detroit Edison and the Michigan Public Service Commission relied upon existing precedents to determine the
legality of the light bulb distribution program.
Mr. Justice Blackmun believed that a fairness defense to
damages should be available whenever the damages would be
based upon conduct required by state law. Because the parties
had not addressed themselves to that issue below, he would not
foreclose that defense to Detroit Edison. He did, however, make
some further observations about the fairness defense: The defense
represents a judicial attempt to permit a party to escape imposition of damages for acts done involuntarily; it is not a declaration that the state restraint is legal. The fairness defense should
only apply to a damage claim and not to a claim for injunctive
relief." '
112. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3121-22 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
114. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975) (decided
also on grounds of lack of standing); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
115. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 789 (3d Cir. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
116. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3128 n.6 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). In determining the bounds of this fairness defense, an analogy, although not
mentioned in Justice Blackmun's opinion, might profitably be drawn to the body of law
which deals with the nonretroactive application of new rules of law. This body of jurisprudence has focused mainly on the criminal process where the issue has been whether a
decision defining new constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal case should be
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The "state action" doctrine announced in Parker served a
useful purpose, coming as it did at the end of the era of substantive due process. It enabled the federal judiciary to avoid returning to substantive examinations of state regulations.' 7 Application of the Sherman Act to a state's regulatory activities would
applied retroactively to convictions of others. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 197
(1973). But the problem of retroactivity is not confined to that area, and increasingly a
doctrine of nonretroactivity is being recognized in civil cases. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). Indeed, the earliest instances of recognition of this doctrine
occurred in civil cases. Id. See, e.g., Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294
(1865); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). It has even been
recognized in the antitrust field by some courts. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 789 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd on othergrounds, 392 U.S. 481
(1968); Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567, 572-73 (N.D. Ga.
1969); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This
doctrine may be especially appropriate in the antitrust field. See note 115 supra and
accompanying text.
The courts generally consider three separate factors in deciding whether to apply a
new rule retroactively. First, the court must decide whether a new principle of law is being
established. Second, the court must examine the history, purpose, and effect of the rule
of law to determine whether retroactivity will further or retard its operation. Finally, the
court must determine whether retroactive application will produce injustice or hardship.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
In Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969), the
court faced the question whether a Parkerclaim of state action could be predicated upon
a statute which later had been declared unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court.
In invalidating the law, the Georgia Supreme Court had been interested in prohibiting
future restrictions on trade. This purpose would not be furthered by allowing a damage
recovery for past action under a then-valid statute, for the loss of competition could not
be revived. The court reasoned that whatever effect the statute may have had on the
defendant's activities, its impact could not be changed by its subsequent invalidity. The
presence of the statute was an operative fact upon which businessmen had relied and
therefore retroactive imposition of treble damages would be unjust.
This reasoning would be equally applicable under Justice Blackmun's approach.
Even if the Sherman Act were held to invalidate a state enactment, those regulated
companies which had been required by state law to obey that enactment should be allowed
to raise it as a defense to damages. The analogy to nonretroactivity cases is not, however,
as applicable under the plurality's approach, which does not substantively examine the
state enactment and then determine the liability of the particular defendant; rather, it
questions directly whether the federal antitrust laws should be applicable to the particular
defendant's conduct and, if so, whether a damage recovery should be allowed. See also,
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693 (1974); Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84
YALE L.J. 1164 (1975).
117. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 332-33 (1975). The fact that the ParkerCourt realized that
this is what was at issue is demonstrated by the title it gave to the section of its opinion
that dealt with the Sherman Act: "Validity of the Prorate Program under the Sherman
Act." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
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mean precisely such substantive examination."' But circumstances change, and, in light of recent concern about the regulatory process's inflationary effects, it seemed that the Parker
doctrine deserved limitation."' After many previous refusals,2 0
the Court was persuaded to review this doctrine in Cantor.Unfortunately, the Justices could not agree on limits to be placed upon
Parker.
Four of the Justices attempted to limit Parkerseverely, stating that in Parker "[t]he only Sherman Act issue decided was
whether the sovereign State itself, which had been held to be a
person within the meaning of § 7 of the statute, was also subject
to its prohibitions. 1 21 This, of course, is inconsistent with the
ParkerCourt's reasoning.1 2 A fifth Justice would limit Parkerto
its facts. He found that the reasonableness of the state regulation,
rather than the identity of the defendant state officials, justified
the result in Parker. The four remaining Justices continued to
interpret Parker as it has been interpreted as recently as 1975:
Private acts must be compelled by a state acting as sovereign to
be characterized as state action.' 3
The four Justices who would make the Parkerdefense available only to state officials offered no procedure for dealing with
those cases to which Parkerwould not apply. They observed:
Although it is tempting to try to fashion a rule which would
govern the decision of the liability issue and the damage issue
in all future cases presenting state action issues, we believe the
118. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328, 333 (1975).
119. See, e.g., Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State
Regulation, 39 ANTrrRusT L.J. 950 (1970); Note, Regulation, Competition, and Your Local
Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 785.
Former President Ford gave a nationwide television address on October 8, 1974,
outlining 10 ways of combating inflation. N.Y. Times, October 9, 1974, at 1, col. 6. One
of these consisted of several proposals to reduce the inflationary impact of federal
regulation. See Address by President Ford, N.Y. Times, October 9, 1974, at 24, col. 2.
Former President Ford "urge[d] state and local units of government to undertake similar
programs to reduce inflationary effects of their regulatory activity." Id. at 24, col. 3.
120. See note 3 supra.
121. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3117 (1976). These four Justices
were Justice Stevens, who wrote the Court's opinion, and the three Justices who joined
him in his interpretation of Parker: Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. See notes
48-50 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.
123. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The four Justices were Chief
Justice Burger (concurring) and Justice Stewart, joined in his dissent by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
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Court should adhere to its settled policy of giving concrete
meaning to the general language of the Sherman Act by a process of case-by-case adjudication of specific controversies. 2 '
Implicit in this approach is "the consequent difficulty in
predicting with certainty [the Sherman Act's] application to
various specific facts situations."' 25 This lack of guidance for regulated utilities and for their regulating commissions may expose
the regulated utilities to substantial treble damage liability. This
approach is particularly harsh given the limited scope of a defense based on fairness permitted by these four Justices. Since
regulated utilities will no longer be able to claim reliance on a
"justified understanding that [regulated] conduct was immune
from the antitrust laws,"' 28 the only fairness defense remaining
will be one predicated upon a lack of sufficiently significant participation by the regulated utility in the decisionmaking.1 Such
a circumscribed fairness defense appears unjustly to punish a
lack of lobbying power, to deprive the right to petition, and to
hinder state utility regulation by drastically reducing valuable
input from the regulated company.12
In Cantor Justice Blackmun, who agreed with the decision
in Parker because the state program there was reasonable, displayed the most satisfactory approach for dealing with the problem of applying the federal antitrust laws to state-regulated
public utilities. His approach concentrates not on the party's
liability or immunity, but on whether the state-imposed restraint
should stand or fall.'2 9 States and utilities could experiment with
new approaches when needed, but at the same time consumers
124. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3123 (1976).
125. Id. at 3121.
126. Id.
127. See notes 109-110 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 82-94 supra and accompanying text. While Justice Blackmun's rule
of reason involves a substantive examination of state regulation, the result of preemption
by the Sherman Act is different than the result of unconstitutionality under the due
process clause, see, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). It is also different than unconstitutionality under the commerce
clause, see, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Unconstitutionality under the due process or commerce clauses results in regulation being wholly invalidated. But if a state enactment is
invalidated because it is preempted by the Sherman Act, Congress can, if it so desires,
pass a law enabling the state to resume regulating. For example, the McGuire Bill, ch.
745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) 2-5 (1946)), was a congressional
reactioi to the decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951).
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and competitors are protected. The allowance of the broad fairness defense against treble damages advocated by Mr. Justice
Blackmun would mean that state-regulated public utilities would
not have to pay such damages for merely following the dictates
of state law.' 30
While the United States Supreme Court in Cantor did not
resolve the issue of the application of the federal antitrust laws
to state regulated public utilities, the Court's decision does not
portend a bleak future for such utilities. Even if Parkerhas been,
as the dissent says, "trivialize[d] . . .to the point of overrul-

ing,"' 3 ' all of the opinions indicate that utilities, by obeying
certain state regulations, will not necessarily violate the federal
antitrust laws. Private conduct which is regulated by the state in
accordance with federal policy, or in furtherance of a necessary
and significant state interest, appears to be acceptable to the
Court.132 Moreover, where there is a natural monopoly regulated
under standards consonant with those of the federal antitrust
laws, all of the opinions agree that the private conduct is not
necessarily violative of those laws.'33
Sanford M. Adler
130. According to the dissent, this defense will mean that customers of regulated
public utilities will not have the cost of massive treble damage awards passed on to them.
See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3129 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3123. The fear was that a host of state regulatory agencies may be given
broad power to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws for reasons wholly unrelated
either to federal policy or even to any necessary and significant state interest. Id. at 3124
(Burger, C.J., concurring). To have found an exemption for the light bulb exchange
program would have served no federal or state policy. Id. at 3126-28 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). See also id. at 3139 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 3119. (Chief Justice Burger had joined in this part of the Court's opinion);
id. at 3127 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissent believed that no restraint imposed by
a state as an act of government should lead to liability under the federal antitrust laws.
But see note 69 supra.
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IN RE HOFFMAN
Illegitimate Children and Will Construction - A will provision "to issue" should be construed to refer to
illegitimate as well as legitimate descendants in the absence of
an express qualification by the testator. 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385
N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
TRUSTS AND ESTATES -

Why bastard? wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well
compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest
madam's issue? Why brand they us with base? With baseness?
bastardy? base, baseP
This plea for amelioration of the plight of illegitimates was
confronted most recently in a case posing the question: Is an
illegitimate offspring entitled to inherit under a will provision "to
issue" in the absence of unequivocal evidence of the testator's
intent? This question, one of first impression for the New York
State Appellate Division, First Department, was answered in the
affirmative by a unanimous court in In re Hoffman.2 The court's
decision, which marks a radical departure from both ancient 3 and
recent judicial precedent, is based upon recent deyelopments in
constitutional law as well as changes perceived by the court in
societal attitudes toward illegitimates.
Historically, the rights of illegitimates in diverse areas, in1. W. SHAKESPEARE,

KING LEAR,

Act I, scene ii, lines 6-10.

2. 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).

3. At common law, in Blackstone's words:
"The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir
to anyone, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius

filius, he is therefore of kin to nobody and has no ancestor from whom any
inheritable blood can be derived."
H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 25 (1971)(quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (W. Kerr, London 1857)). For early cases following this tradition in ascribing an intent to testator, see Flora v. Anderson, 75 F. 217
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1896); Marsh v. Field, 297 Ill. 251, 130 N.E. 753 (1921); Lyon v. Lyon, 88
Me. 395, 34 A. 180 (1896); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mischou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3
(1947); Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85, 67 A. 991 (1907). The courts have justified this canon
of construction against illegitimates on the assumption that a testator would more than
likely have intended to devise and bequeath to only legal heirs. For a discussion of this
traditional construction, see Note, The Effect of Statutes Altering the Position of Illegitimate Children on Judicial Constructionof Wills, 45 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1932).
4. For more recent cases adopting this same policy against illegitimates, see, e.g., In
re Will of Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1975); In re
Thomas, 81 Misc. 2d 891, 367 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1975); In re Belton, 70
Misc. 2d 814, 335 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
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cluding inheritance, have been severely circumscribed.' In its
struggle to ameliorate the plight of illegitimates, however, the
Hoffman court has left its proposed solution inordinately vulnerable to criticism. This vulnerability results from the court's failure adequately to establish definitive standards and guidelines
for the application of this new pronouncement in future cases.
In defense of the court's decision in Hoffman, the unresolved
ambiguities' and unaddressed clashes with statutory policy and
pronouncement' will be explored in this note. Workable solutions
to these serious problems will be proposed. These include possible
judicial and statutory formulations, with a view toward strengthening the basis of the progressive, though problematic, Hoffman
approach. Statutory proposals offer the preferred solution, since
they provide broad, coordinated measures and assure the necessary uniformity. Such a uniform position would clear up existing
ambiguities concerning the inheritance rights of illegitimates.8
Mary U. Hoffman died in 1951 leaving a will which created
a trust. The trust provided that each of two cousins was to receive income for life, to continue until the death of the survivor.
Upon the death of the first cousin, his one-half share of the income was made payable for the balance of the trust's duration "to
his issue." One cousin was still living at the time of this contest.
The other, William Bayard Hawthorne, died in 1965, survived by
a daughter and a son. The son, Stephen Bayard Hawthorne, died
in 1972, leaving two children. Stephen never married the mother
of these two children and no order of filiation9 had been entered.
However, Stephen Bayard Hawthorne voluntarily acknowledged
5. Illegitimates have not only been discriminated against with regard to their right
to inherit, but also with regard to their rights to parental support, workmen's compensa.
tion benefits, wrongful death causes of action, and social security benefits. In recent years,
however, these rights have been extended to some degree. See New Jersey Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (the right to welfare assistance accrues to both illegiti.
mates and legitimates); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (the right to parental support
accrues to both legitimates and illegitimates); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US.
164 (1971) (workmen's compensation benefits should be paid to both illegitimates and
legitimates upon the death of the father); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (the equal protection clause
affords illegitimates the same right as legitimate children to maintain a wrongful death
action).
6. See text accompanying notes 36-48 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 49-63 infra.
8. See notes 154-164 and accompanying text infra.
9. "If the court finds the male party is the father of the child, it shall make an order
of filiation, declaring paternity." N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 542 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
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these two children during his lifetime,"0 and paternity was stipulated for the purposes of this litigation." The Surrogate's proceeding'2 settled the account of the trustee, The Bank of New York,
and construed the will to exclude these illegitimate infants from
the class depicted by the word "issue." The Appellate Division,
First Department, reversed this construction based upon a
change in the perception of rights for illegitimates. The court
found this change in attitude reflected in federal 3 and state"
statutes as well as in treatises 5 on the subject.
Prior to Hoffman, courts had placed the burden on the illegitimate claimant to demonstrate the testator's clear and unequivocal intent to include illegitimates within the category of
"issue."'" The essence of the court's position in Hoffman is that
where no unequivocal facts elucidate the testator's intent, equal
and opposite inferences as to his intent to include or exclude
illegitimate issue must follow. In such a situation, the court
10. Stipulation of the Parties, In re Hoffman, Index No. P837/1951 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County Feb. 24, 1975).
11. Brief for Appellant at 3, Brief for Respondent at 3, In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div.
2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
12. The Surrogate's decree was entered on September 23, 1975, in New York County
(DiFalco, S.).
13. The federal provisions which the court cited are 33 U.S.C. § 902(14) (1970 &
Supp. VI 1976), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A) (1974), 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1970), 8 U.S.C. § 1432
(1970), 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(c) (1959 & Supp. VI 1976), 38 U.S.C. § 765 (1965), 37 U.S.C. §
401 (1973 & Supp. VI 1976), and 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1976). In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d
55, 61 n.7, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 n. 7 (1st Dep't 1976).
14. The New York State statutes which the court cited are N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 24
(McKinney Supp. 1976), N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 2(11) (McKinney 1968), N.Y. GEN.
CONSTR. LAW § 59 (McKinney 1951), N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1976),
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1976), N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4138
(McKinney 1971), N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4135 (McKinney 1971), N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 33 (McKinney 1964), N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 145 (McKinney 1962) (repealed & reenacted
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney Supp. 1976)), and N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 175
(McKinney 1964). See In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 61 n.7, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 n.7
(1st Dep't 1976).
15. The court cites H. KRAUSE, ILLErriAcY: LAW AND SOcIAL POucY (1971) and S.
HARTLEY, ILLEGmMACY (1975). See In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 61 & n.6, 385
N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 & n. 6 (1st Dep't 1976).
16. See, e.g., In re Underhill's Estate, 176 Misc. 737, 739, 28 N.Y.S.2d 984, 986 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941), where the court stated:
It is to be presumed that the testator used words in their ordinary and commonly
accepted meaning unless the context of the will or the relevant attending
circumstances indicate a different sense. The word "issue" has been many times
interpreted by the courts of this State and has been uniformly construed to
mean lawful issue and to exclude illegitimate offspring. Such is the settled
interpretation of the term even though the word in the will is not qualified by
the adjective "lawful."
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deemed it unfair to exercise "judicial preference"' 7 to bar illegitimates completely from testamentary dispositions in favor of antiquated notions of morality. Such morality, according to the
Hoffman court, has its roots "in an earlier society where there was
no sense of injustice in the teaching that the sins of the fathers
were to be visited upon their children and succeeding generations."' 8 The court viewed this presumption against illegitimates
as an irrebuttable and insurmountable obstacle to recovery.
Under circumstances like those presented in Hoffman, where
much time has elapsed since the testator's death, it is almost
impossible for the illegitimate to substantiate the testator's intent to include illegitimates.
The court in Hoffman detected a softening in the judicial
policy toward illegitimates' rights in inheritance. It perceived this
changing attitude in instances where courts have strained to
"legitimize" persons previously labeled illegitimates, such as
children of technically void marriages'" and children born out of
wedlock but legitimized by their parents' subsequent marriage. 0
The court stressed that these two types of illegitimates have often
recovered even under the more limited will provision "to lawful
21
issue."
The Hoffman court further justified its departure from common law precedent by demonstrating that principles of equality
for illegitimates have traditionally existed, even during an era
marked by vely strong anti-equality sentiments. The court relied
upon Eaton v. Eaton,22 a 1914 Connecticut will construction case,
as evidence of this past judicial enlightenment. However, it failed
to mention the presence of an additional factor in Eaton which
further justified an outcome in favor of illegitimates: The testator
in that case knew of the existence of his daughter's illegitimate
17. In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 66, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 56 (1st Dep't 1976).
18. Id. at 56, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (quoting ExoDus, 20:4; W. SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT
OF VENICE, Act III, scene v, line 1).
19. See, e.g., In re Vought, 29 App. Div. 2d 97, 285 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1st Dep't 1967).
20. See, e.g., Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N.E. 569 (1908); In re Shelfer,
139 Misc. 519, 249 N.Y.S. 102 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1931).
21. In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 59, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 52-53 (1st Dep't 1976).
Courts have held that when the word relating to children in the will is qualified by the
adjective "lawful," it is ordinarily understood to mean those begotten and born in lawful
wedlock and none others. Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div. 227, 229-30 (2d Dep't
1912).
22. 88 Conn. 269, 91 A. 191 (1914). Accord, In re Ellis' Estate, 225 Iowa 1279, 282
N.W. 758 (1938).
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child. A reasonable testator would not have used the unrestricted
wording "to issue" had he not intended this known illegitimate
to share in his will. Despite the presence of this possibly distinguishing factor, Eaton is still valuable precedent because of its
strong language supporting illegitimates' inheritance rights in
will constructions.Y
The court in Hoffman overstated its position when it declared that the most recent holding against illegitimates in this
context was the thirty-five-year-old case In re Underhill's Estate.24 The Hoffman court failed to discuss Estate of Leo Levy, 2
a twelve-year-old New York County Surrogate's Court decision.
The court in Leo Levy, declaring that the words "her descendants" and "more remote descendants" used in a will did not
include the illegitimate child of the deceased's wife, based its
construction of this wording upon the pronouncement in a prior
New York case. 2 This prior case had established the general rule
of construction that when the words "child," "children," or
"descendants" are used in a statute, these terms include legitimate or lawful children or descendants.2 However, this failure to
deal with Leo Levy does not mar the logic of the Hoffman result.
The Hoffman court's premise was that despite the scarcity of
judicial precedent in favor of including illegimates, the current
use of a court-imposed presumption of "issue" which would operate automatically to exclude illegitimates would be grossly unfair
23. The majority in Eaton stated:
In a word, the natural corollary of the English rule that the word "child" or

"children," when used in a statute, is to be restrained to signify legitimates only,
is done away with as it logically must be. That corollary is the logical consequence of the proposition that the illegitimate is the child of nobody. When that
proposition is transposed into ours that an illegitimate is the child of its mother,
then all logical foundation for the corollary that the word "child" or "children"
in statute, will, or deed is to be interpreted as limited to legitimates disappears,
and the logical corollary becomes the reverse, so that presumptively the word
"child" or "children" in a will embraces offspring legitimate and illegitimate.

Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 282, 91 A. 191, 195 (1914).
24. 116 Misc. 737, 28 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1941). See note 16 supra
and accompanying text.

25. 151 N.Y.L.J. 58 at 14, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County March 24, 1964). This case
was cited by the FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK LEG.

Doc. No. 19, at 198 (May 31, 1965). The Hoffman court discussed this report, in which
Leo Levy was cited, but did not discuss this case itself. In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d
55, 57 n.1, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 n.1 (1st Dep't 1976).

26. In re Cady, 257 App. Div. 129, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 688,
23 N.E.2d 18 (1939).

27. Id. at 130, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
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and contrary to the modern view.28 It indicated that the trend
toward statutory revision"9 was well underway when the testator
executed the will in controversy."
The court in Hoffman used another means to circumvent the
traditional common law deference to precedent. Emphasizing the
equally longstanding historical recognition of the flexibility of law
under changing circumstances, the court quoted from another
recent case: "[F]rom the earliest times, the doctrine of stare
decisis did not require a strict adherence to precedent in every
instance.""As final justification for its departure from precedent, the
Hoffman court relied on expanding concepts of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While the court did not
fully develop this justification, it nevertheless affords a convincing rationale when comprehensively analyzed. 2
The most crucial deficiency in the Hoffman opinion is the
lack of acknowledgment and resolution of several complex and
closely related issues. In failing to clarify the specific requirements for setting off future applications of its holding, the court
has created a danger of possible fraud, injustice, and arguable
inconsistencies with related statutory policy. The court did not
explore the ramifications or the impact of its new recognition of
an illegitimate's right to inherit in this limited context, nor did
it address an undesirable possible consequence: Permitting
blanket inheritance rights for all illegitimates may actually
undermine the intents of long-deceased testators by making their
wills, probated long ago, subject to current attack. Furthermore,
Hoffman did not answer the question whether this liberalizing
holding is confined to situations like Hoffman where there exists
no evidence of the testator's actual intent. The court gave no
indication of the quantity and type of evidence required for proof
of paternity in a will construction proceeding. Moreover, the
court failed to discuss whether the standards for paternity proof
in intestate succession should carry over to will construction proceedings, and it failed to deal with the possibility that its decision
28.
29.
30.
1976).
31.
(1976).
32.

In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 57, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (lst Dep't 1976).
Sed notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 61 & n.7, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 54 & n.7 (lst Dep't
In re Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 498-99, 348 N.E. 2d 905, 908, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 429, 432
See text accompanying notes 100-153 infra.
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might result in an onslaught of spurious claims that would unduly
burden probate proceedings. Finally, the Hoffman opinion did
not substantiate adequately its conclusion that the presumption
against illegitimates is unconstitutional because of "expanding
concepts of equal protection."3 3 This superficial treatment is especially significant inasmuch as the court did not distinguish a
seemingly contrary United States Supreme Court pronouncement on the inheritance rights of illegitimates.3 4 Nor did the court
cite or explain a recent New York Court of Appeals decision
which upheld the constitutionality of New York's statutory presumption against unfiliated illegitimates inheriting by intestate
succession.
THE EFFECT OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF

Hoffman

The court in Hoffman did not discuss the problem of
"skeleton rattling" 3 in applying this new interpretation of the
word "issue" to previously probated wills. This problem concerns
the possibility that every prior provision "to issue" in which illegitimates were involved may now be subjected to this modern
construction of testator's intent, perhaps in derogation of the testator's true intent.3 7 The potential injustice in this is evident in
the situation where a long-deceased testator specifically provided
for his illegitimate child in his will. According to Hoffman, if a
testator also made a more generalized bequest "to issue" in his
will, it is possible that this illegitimate child would take twice.
This would result in a windfall for the illegitimate at the expense
of testator's legitimate heirs.
This unjust result, however, is not necessarily mandated by
Hoffman's abrogation of the presumption against illegitimates.
According to Hoffman, once facts against the illegitimate's position are introduced, the illegitimate is once again required to
submit affirmative proof that the testator intended to include
him.38 That the testator specifically provided for this illegitimate
33. See text accompanying notes 100-102 infra.
34. The court merely stated "but cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)." See In
re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 66, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 56 (1st Dep't 1976). Labine held

that where a statute regulating inheritance is in issue, it must be upheld so long as it is
supported by a reasonable basis. See text accompanying notes 109-116 infra.
35. In re Estate of Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
36. 10 Overview: Current Developments in Estates, Trusts and Taxes, at 4 (Manufacturers Hanover Trust Publication, 1976).

37. Id. at 5.
38. See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
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in his will may be such a fact. Once this burden shifts to the
illegitimate, it would be difficult to make the requisite showing
if indeed the testator truly intended to provide for this illegitimate child exclusively through the specific will provision.
It is also possible, however, for a court to construe a specific
will provision to an illegitimate in a contrary manner. That is, not
as evidence that the illegitimate has been fully provided for, but
rather as evidence of good will between the testator and the illegitimate which carried over to the testator's other less explicit will
provision.
Thus, there are two plausible and opposite interpretations
that may be derived in this situation: (1) that the illegitimate has
already been provided for fully without the provision "to issue,"
or (2) that the specific provision is evidence of testator's desire
also to include this illegitimate in his provision "to issue." Fraud
on the estate of the ancestor will most probably not occur if such
a special provision is construed in the former manner.
However, to preclude the greater potential for fraud inherent
in the latter interpretation, courts should strictly limit Hoffman
to prospective application only. In the future, such cases will
undoubtedly arise because of the many questions unanswered by
Hoffman. Prospective application, which would prevent clashes
with true testamentary intent that might otherwise arise if longclosed estates were reopened, is justifiable on the authority of
past decisions in this area. 9 Moreover, provisions for prospective
application only are common in statutory schemes; many statutes are written with an "effective date."4 Other statutes deal
with this problem by providing that a controversial term shall be
defined in a new way as of a certain date, and expressly stipulating that the previous definitions govern cases prior to that date."
THE IMPACT OF

Hoffman

It is uncertain whether the rules in Hoffman will apply when
facts exist which exhibit the testator's intent. Those opposing the
39. See Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968); Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil
& Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932). For analogous cases in the criminal area, see Desist
v. United- States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). For a
full discussion of this issue, see Annot., UnitedStates Supreme Court Views as to Retroactive Effect of its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 22 L. Ed. 2d 821, 832-35 (1970).
40. E.g., N.Y. EST., PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967) provided an
effective date, Sept. 1, 1967, for its section 4(b).
41. E.g., N.Y. DOM. EL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1964).
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application of Hoffman in such cases" maintain that once facts
are presented on either side of the controversy, the abolition of a
presumption against illegitimates is no longer required by logic
or reason. Once an illegitimate can present evidence exhibiting
that the testator intended to include him, the abolition of such
presumption is unnecessary. Gray and Rudovsky, 3 leading commentators on equal protection and illegitimates' rights, have asserted this position, stating: "[If it can be shown that the presumption has a factual basis and if rebuttal is not made unreasonably difficult, this may be one classification based on illegitimacy which is still constitutional after Levy." 4
Further justification for this reading of Hoffman may be
found in the Hoffman opinion itself: "Certainly the automatic
exclusion of illegitimates from a bequest to a category such as
'children' would not be permissible. On the other hand, a bequest
to legitimate 'children' would cut off any claim an illegitimate
child might assert."4 5 The commentators have urged, as the
Hoffman court held, that the initial burden of coming forward to
establish the testator's intent should be placed upon the illegitimate's opponent." Once the opponent meets this burden, the
burden of coming forward would shift to the illegitimate. Thus
far, this seems to be a logical reading of Hoffman.
It would be illogical, however, to extend this reading of
Hoffman to keep the burden of persuasion on the illegitimate if
evidence of the testator's intent exists. Such a reading would
place an undue burden on illegitimates, contrary to the thrust of
the Hoffman opinion. Gray and Rudovsky would consider any
such permanent burden of persuasion on illegitimates "unreasonably difficult. 4 7 A close examination of Hoffman indicates a
strong policy favoring an illegitimate's right to inherit on an equal
footing with legitimates.48 The court in Hoffman intended to shift
the ultimate burden of persuasion to the illegitimate's opponent,
42. See Memorandum of law prepared by Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons, & Gates by
J. A. Jannuzzo concerning In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (lstDep't
1976). A copy of this memorandum, which was prepared in connection with a case posing
legal issues similar to those in Hoffman, is on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review.
43. Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana
and Glona v. American Guarantee& Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
44. Id. at 26 (citing Levy v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)).
45. In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 64, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 55 (1976) (quoting H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGrriAcY: LAW AND

SociAL Poucy 94 (1971)).

46. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
47. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
48. See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
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even when some factual data regarding testator's intent are available. Moreover, the above reading of Hoffman would pose serious
problems for courts attempting to determine whether sufficient
facts had been presented to shift this burden.
In sum, the Hoffman court abolished the traditional presumption that illegitimates are not included in a will provision
"to issue," thus shifting the burdens of production and persuasion to the illegitimate's adversary. The presence of factual data
concerning testator's intent which is contrary to the illegitimate's
position will logically shift the burden of production back to the
illegitimate. The burden of persuasion should nevertheless remain on the opponent.
To elucidate clearly the goals of the state in protecting illegitimates, a statutory formulation should be enacted.
Hoffman: CONFLICT OR HARMONY WITH PRIOR LEGISLATIVE POLICY?
The flexible proof of paternity permitted in Hoffman, which
allowed an illegitimate to inherit absent an order of filiation,
arguably conflicts with the stricter requirements of section 4-1.2
(a) (2)" g of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL).
Under this section, which governs inheritance through intestate succession by illegitimates, a court determination of paternity must have been entered during the father's lifetime and
within two years of the child's birth to permit an illegitimate to
inherit from his father.
It is logical to assume that the intestacy statute's requirements for paternity proof will carry over to a will construction
situation such as the one involved in Hoffman. The function of
an intestacy statute is to provide a legislative presumption of the
testamentary intent of the average person in the community."

49. N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUST LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967) provides:

An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the
lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceed-

ing instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the
birth of the child.
See also N.Y. EST., PoWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(3) (McKinney 1967), declaring the
insufficiency of support agreements as proof of paternity for inheritance, and N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 517 (McKinney 1967), reiterating the two-year statute of limitations on the
institution of paternity proceedings in certain cases.
50. H. KRAUSE, IILEG1TIMACY: LAW AND SociAL Poxacy 88 (1971); J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, FAMLY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE
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The Hoffman case similarly suggests a presumption regarding the
testamentary intent of this average person. In a will construction
proceeding, this presumption is judicially imposed. Both situations involve inferences drawn by the government regarding society's attitude toward illegitimates. The quantity and type of
proof of paternity required should remain constant in both because the same policy considerations-prevention of fraud and
added administrative burden-apply equally to the two situations.
Inquiry into the legislative history of this intestacy statute
generates proof that the drafters expected its paternity proof requirements to carry over to will construction proceedings.-' The
New York State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and
Simplification of the Law of Estates52 was concerned with striking
a proper balance between alleviating inheritance difficulties of
illegitimates on the one hand and preventing spurious inheritance
claims on the other. It recommended a compromise which was
incorporated in section 4-1.2 of the EPTL. Evidencing its intent
to effectuate this carryover, the Commission stated:
The adoption of the recommendations proposed in this report
will safeguard the interests of the illegitimate in the proceeds of
a successful action for wrongful death, and estates passing by
will or devise, as well as in estates descending and being distributed by operation of the law of intestate succession."
Further support for the proposition that courts look to the
intestacy statute to define the meaning of the words "child" or
"issue" in a will is found in this same Commission's report." The
report discussed Estate of Leo Levy 55 to illustrate this carryover. 5
In Leo Levy the court determined that the phrase "her descendants" in a will did not include illegitimate descendants. The
Commission attributed this result to the court's adoption of the
intestacy statute's presumption against illegitimates where no
PLANNING 162-63 (1972). See also FouRTH REPor OF TH COMMISSION ON ESTATES, STATE
oF NEW YORK LEG. Doc. No. 19, at 198 (May 31, 1965).
51. FouRTH REPORT OF THE COMUSSION ON ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK LEG. Doc.
No. 19, at 199 (May 31, 1965).
52. Id. at 177-201.
53. Id. at 199.
54. Id.
55. 151 N.Y.L.J. 58, at 14, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County March 24, 1964).
56. FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMSSION ON ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK LEG. Doc.
No. 19, at 199 (May 31, 1965).
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evidence of the testator's intent is proffered. 7
The antilapse provision of the New York EPTL5 affords further support for the proposition that the requirements for proof
of paternity from the intestacy statute carry over to cases involving inheritance by will. The antilapse statute enables a testamentary beneficiary's next of kin to take in the event that the
beneficiary predeceases the testator. For illegitimates, this inheritance through their father's kin.is dependent upon the requirements of EPTL section 4-1.2.1Q This section thus determines the
circumstances in which an illegitimate will be included as issue
in the interpretation of a will for purposes of the antilapse statute.
Similarly, statutory formulations in other states refer to and
are guided by the statutes governing inheritance by or from illegitimates in intestacy in determining whether illegitimates should
be included in testamentary gifts to a class such as "children" or
"issue." 60 Federal courts have used the intestacy statutes as
guidelines in determining whether "children" includes illegitimates in contexts which are not directly related to inheritance.6 '
The following anomaly might occur as a result of the differing
requirements for proof of paternity: Should a will provide a legacy
to a brother who predeceases the testator, the New York antilapse
statute would exclude illegitimate issue of that brother from the
57. The Commission stated: "This result is reached because the testator's intent is
assumed to be in harmony with the statute governing descent and distribution of property
to illegitimate children." Id. at 198.
58. N.Y. EST., POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 1967) provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) Unless the will provides otherwise:
(1) Whenever a testamentary disposition is made to the issue or to
a brother or sister of the testator, and such beneficiary dies during the
lifetime of the testator leaving issue surviving such testator, such
disposition does not lapse but vests in such surviving issue ....
(2) (b) As used in this section, the terms "issue", "surviving issue"
and "issue surviving" include adopted children and illegitimate children; for this purpose, an illegitimate is the child of his mother and
is the child of his father if he is entitled to inherit from his father under
4-1.2.
59. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
60. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-2-7, 29-1-6-1(e)(Burns Supp. 1976). See also
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (official text 1969).
61. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956), where the Court, faced with
the question whether an illegitimate child should be included within the term "children"
as used in a federal copyright statute, looked to the state laws governing the descent of
property in the absence of a definition in the federal statute itself. See also Matthew v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1976) (involving "children" and social security benefits);
Grove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1959) (involving "children"
and insurance).
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bequest unless an order of filiation had been entered;"2 under the
holding in Hoffman, this order of filiation would be useful but not
necessary to permit such illegitimate to take under a bequest "to
issue." The following example illustrates another inconsistency:
Should a mother die intestate leaving only the illegitimate
daughter of an intestate predeceased son, this illegitimate daughter would not be able to inherit from her father unless an order
of filiation had been entered. Yet, under Hoffman, she could
share in her father's mother's estate as "issue" of her father. She
would be her father's representative in the estate. Reading the
applicable New York State provision, EPTL section 4-1.1,13 to-

gether with Hoffman's holding that "issue" includes illegitimates, this illegitimate may inherit through, but not from, her
father.
Nevertheless, it may be posited that Hoffman and its proof
of paternity requirements are more in harmony with general New
York statutory policy than is the EPTL intestacy provision, section 4-1.2 itself. For instance, the law of workmen's compensation
benefits is far more liberal regarding paternity proof requirements
for the receipt of benefits by "issue."" No court order entered
within two years of the child's birth is required. As statutory
support for its decision, the Hoffman court cited New York's
wrongful death provision," which makes an illegitimate child the
distributee of his father in wrongful death actions regardless of
whether an order of filiation has ever been entered. The court also
noted the early liberalization of illegitimates' inheritance rights
by the legislative relabeling as "legitimate" of all children of
"void" marriages as well as all illegitimates whose parents had
62. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(2)(b) (McKinney 1967). For the full text

of this provision, see note 58 supra.
63. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967). This section provides,

in pertinent part:
The property of a decedent not disposed of by will, after payment of administration and funeral expenses, debts and taxes, shall be distributed as follows:
(a) If a decedent is survived by:
(6) Issue, and no spouse, the whole to issue per stirpes.
64. N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 2(11) (McKinney 1965) provides: "'Child' shall include
a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased."
65. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.5 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) provides,
in pertinent part: "For the purposes of this part [wrongful death action], an illegitimate
child is the distributee of his father and the father of an illegitimate child is that child's
distributee."
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subsequently married.66 In addition, it is noteworthy that the
New York statute, which requires paternity proof in order to obtain paternal support, provides a longer time period during which
claims of paternity may be raised and proven by an illegitimate.
It may be raised at any time in a support proceeding and may be
inferred from a voluntary acknowledgment by the father."
The lesser standard of proof of paternity required by these
other New York statutes has been justified as involving the unchangeable biological relationship between parent and child."
The basis of wrongful death, workmen's compensation, and paternal support causes of action is the existence of this biological
relationship, which cannot be undone by the subjective wishes of
the parent. Inheritance rights, on the other hand, are deemed
only an "inchoate expectancy" for the illegitimate because they
depend on the subjective testamentary desires of each parent."
This has been proposed as a justification for the stricter requirements for paternity proof in the inheritance area.
Nevertheless, the general legislative trend toward ameliorating the plight of illegitimates is manifest within EPTL section 41.2 itself. Despite this provision's strict paternity proof requirement for inheritance from the father, it is more liberal than the
prior statutory formulation. The previous law precluded illegitimates from inheriting at all from the father or from the mother's
kindred, and allowed them to inherit from the mother herself only
in the absence of legitimate issue.70 Additionally, the antilapse
66. 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 59 n.3, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 52 n.3 (1st Dep't 1976). See also
notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
67. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 517 (Consol. Supp. 1975) and accompanying annota.
tions. It has been held that the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 517 of the
Family Court Act is inapplicable to a support proceeding under article 4 of the Family
Court Act. It also has been held that a claim of paternity can be asserted at any time in
a support proceeding under § 418 of the Family Court Act because the court has continu.
ing jurisdiction over support proceedings under N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 451 (Consol. 1974).
Hansom v. Hansom, 75 Misc. 2d 3, 346 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Fain. Ct. Richmond County 1973).
68. In re Estate of Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
69. Id. at 81, 340 N.E.2d at 723, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
70. See N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 Practice Commentary (McKinney
1967), which states:
Subdivision 14 of section 83 [now EPTL § 4-1.2], dealing with the inheritance rights of the illegitimate or the legitimate descendants of a deceased
illegitimate, restricted such rights to inheritance from the estate of the mother,
and, then, only when there were no lawful issue; the illegitimate was not entitled, under the statute or otherwise, to inherit from the putative father or the
father's kindred. The right of the illegitimate to inherit from the mother did not
extend to the mother's kindred, although it has been held that an illegitimate
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provision of the EPTL specifically includes illegitimates within
the category of "issue."'
In light of this liberalizing trend, EPTL section 4-1.2 may
itself conflict with the standards set forth in other contexts for

illegitimates' inheritance rights. Hoffman may serve only to ferret
out this preexistent inconsistency of EPTL section 4-1.2. The fact

of this inconsistency has already been demonstrated

2

in provi-

sions outside the EPTL, and is also evident in the current dispute
over the constitutionality of the strict paternity proof requirements. The determination in In re Estate of Lalli,73 which upheld
the constitutionality of section 4-1.2's order of filiation require-

ment within the testator's lifetime, is not a final pronouncement
on this issue, since this case is presently pending on the Supreme

Court docket.74 An Illinois case presenting issues similar to those
in Lalli also has been argued before the Supreme Court."

EPTL section 4-1.2(a)(2) arguably conflicts with the generalized descent and distribution provision, EPTL section 41.1(a)(6),11 which places no independent limit on those who are
included as "issue" and thus take in intestacy per stirpes. EPTL
child can inherit, under subdivision 8 of section 83, as "a relative on the part of
the mother" from another illegitimate child of the mother. [Citations omitted.]
In a broad reversal of policy, the 1965 enactment of section 83-a of the
Decedent Estate Law repealed the foregoing restrictive subdivisions of section
83 ....
71. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(2)(b) (McKinney 1967). For the text of
this provision, see note 58 supra. But see N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(2)(b)
Practice Commentary (McKinney 1967), where it is stated: "It is extremely important to
note that this extension of the rights of illegitimate children does not necessarily augur
like extensions for other purposes of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law."
72. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
73. 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
74. In re Estate of Lalli, 38 N.Y. 2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975),
appeal docketed sub noma.
Lalli v. Lalli, No: 75-1148 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1976).
75. Trimble v. Gordon, No. 75-5952 (Ill.
1975), prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976)
jargued Dec. 7, 1976). The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was stated from the
bench as an affirmance of the Illinois intestacy statute, based on the principles set forth
in In re Estate of Louis Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). In Karas the court
held that the Illinois law permitting illegitimates to inherit from mother but not from
father bears a rational relation to a valid governmental purpose and does not deny equal
protection. The petitioner in that case had been acknowledged by her father. Nevertheless, the court concluded that expansion of inheritance rights of an illegitimate child in
the estate of a father who died intestate must be left to legislative modification.
76. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967). For the text of
this provision, see note 49 supra.N.Y. EST., PoWERS & TRusTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(6) (McKinney 1967). For the text of this provision, see note 63 supra.
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the statutory definition of issue, provides that

"issue" are the descendants in any degree from a common ancestor unless proof to the contrary is evident. It does not limit the
scope of possible proof of paternity. There is no cross-reference in
section 4-1.1(a)(6) to the paternity proof requirements of section
4-1.2(a)(2). This might suggest that these inconsistencies in paternity proof requirements have always existed in New York law,
since the EPTL nowhere states that "issue" does not include
illegitimates. Hoffman therefore serves to point out the already
existing conflict between sections 4-1.2 and 4-1.1, the general
descent and distribution provision. This conflict becomes evident
when the general descent provision is interpreted in a manner in
keeping with the general statutory trend toward expanding the
inheritance rights of illegitimates.
The solution is not to reject the Hoffman holding, which is
only symptomatic of a general relaxation in the requirements for
proof of paternity. Rather, the optimal solution would include a
statutory compromise between the strict proof requirements of
EPTL section 4-1.2(a) (2) and Hoffman's implied liberalization of
the degree of proof required. 8 Until this legislative clarification
can be accomplished, the holding in Hoffman should be affirmed
because it is the preferable approach in light of modern circumstances; it does not conflict with overall statutory policy toward illegitimates.
DIFFICULTIES OF PATERNITY PROOF UNEXPLORED BY
FRAUD AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS

Hoffman

-

One related problem unexplored by Hoffman is that this
decision may lead to a multitude of fraudulent inheritance
claims. It has been contended that total equality for illegitimates
would present an undue burden on the probate of wills. It has
also been asserted that presumptions favoring illegitimates will
77. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.10 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) provides:

(a) Unless a contrary intention is indicated:
(1) Issue are the descendants in any degree from a common ancestor.
(2) The terms "issue" and "descendants", in subparagraph (1), include adopted children.
78. See text accompanying notes 161-164 infra.
79. See FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK LEG. Doc.
No. 19, at 199-201 (May 31, 1965). Contra, Brief for Appellant at 10-12, In re Hoffman,
53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
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often allow fraudulent claimants unjustly to share in bequests
rightfully belonging only to testators' legitimate heirs."
First, it must be noted that even the most fervent advocates
of equal treatment for illegitimates have agreed that the problems
in ascertaining paternity will maintain illegitimacy as a relevant
consideration. Paternity can never be established with scientific
accuracy." However, the claim that such administrative difficulties justify a blanket denial to illegitimates has generally been
repudiated. The Court in Gomez v. Perez2 stated: "We recognize
the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity. Those
problems are not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they
be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Such a denial of rights was condemned in Gomez because the law has never required scientifically precise accuracy, and courts make legally binding determinations in paternity proceedings with an accuracy not unlike that
obtained in other civil actions. To preclude illegitimates from
inheriting due to inconclusive paternity proof is to elevate procedural and evidentiary difficulties to the level of total substantive
barriers to recovery. The mere possibility of these problems of
fraud and administrative burden does not justify a conclusive
presumption that they will always outweigh the state's interest
in providing a legal benefit to illegitimate children. 84 The problem
bf fraud is greatly exaggerated by opponents of equality. As
argued by appellants in Hoffman, more often than not the existence of an illegitimate child is known to the family, and the fact
of paternity is undisputed. "The product of somebody's youthful
indiscretion who surfaces unexpectedly to claim a share of the
80. See FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK LEG. Doc.
No. 19, at 199-201 (May 31, 1965). Contra, Brief for Appellant at 10-12, In re Hoffman,
53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
81. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGMMACY: LAW AND SOCL4 POUCY (1971). "[W]e may conclude
that even if blood typing cannot establish paternity positively in medical terms, the
positive proof of paternity may reach a level of probability which is entirely acceptable in
legal terms." Id. at 128.
The problem of ascertaining paternity will always remain the irreducible minimum relevance of birth out of wedlock and it may be stipulated that "equal
protection" must be limited to those illegitimates whose paternity has been
established with the same degree of probability as the paternity of a legitimate
child is established by his birth in wedlock.
Id. at 82.
82. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
83. Id. at 538. Accord, Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76
(1968).
84. See Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479, 512 (1974).
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family fortune is more likely to remain a figure of melodrama
than to become a substantial threat to the orderly settlement of
estates." 85 Often, paternity has been voluntarily acknowledged
and thus an adversary proceeding, with inherent difficulties of
proof, is not necessary to settle every inheritance claim brought
by an illegitimate. Furthermore, paternity is no more difficult to
prove or disprove than many other types of claims with which
courts deal daily.86 The illegitimate is given every opportunity to
prove paternity, and the factfinder is faced with similar issues,
during support proceedings. 7 It is the function of the factfinder
to resolve difficult factual issues. This function should not easily
be shirked.
Equal inheritance rights for illegitimates may cause a hardship on the accounting trustee. It might be argued that under
Hoffman he must now serve all illegitimate, as well as legitimate,
heirs with process 88 in each case where the will includes a provision "to issue." Further complications flowing from this service
of process requirement are articulated in In re Will of Flemm. 9
In that case, a purported illegitimate child filed a notice of appearance in the probate proceeding involving the will of the putative father. The preliminary executors of the will moved to strike
this intervention. Surrogate Sobel granted the motion to strike
because of the severe burden on the trustee in serving all illegitimates." The court stated: "How does one cite and serve an illegitimate of whose existence neither family nor personal representative may be aware?"'" This same court discussed other potential
problems, noting:
And of greatest concern [is] how [to] achieve finality of decree
85. Brief for Appellant at 11, In re Hoffman, 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S,2d 49
(1st Dep't 1976).
86. See, e.g., H. KRAusE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POUCY (1971), where the
author states:
[E]ven if, on the average it is more difficult to trace illegitimate than legitimate descent and even if it is easier to prove illegitimate maternity than paternity, the courts do not deal with averages. The fact that uncertainty may exist
in one illegitimate paternity case is not to say that uncertainty exists in another
case.
Id. at 82.
87. See note 67 supra.
88. E.g., in New York the statute requires service of process on all probate claimants.
N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRoc. ACT § 1403 (McKinney 1967).
89. 85 Misc. 2d 855, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1975).
90. Id. at 859, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
91. Id.
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in any estate when there always exists the possibility however
remote of a secret illegitimate lurking in the buried past of a
parent or an ancester of a class of beneficiaries [.1 Finality in
decree is essential in the Surrogates' Courts since title to real
property passes under such decree.2
It might be feared that a further implication of this case is that
once one illegitimate claims trust fund assets, others will follow
in his wake, creating insecurity and lack of finality in any court's
probate decree.13 This problem, combined with the ramifications
of process serving requirements, may thus lead to large scale instability in the entire estate administration process.
The severity of this administrative burden, like that of paternity determination, is overstated. First, an executor's or administrator's duty is generally limited to serving those of whom
he is or may be expected to become aware. 4 The relatively rare
occurrence of an illegitimate who suddenly "crawls out of the
woodwork" certainly falls outside this category. In the everyday
situation involving known illegitimates, these claimants should
be no more difficult to cite and serve than known legitimates. The
scope of this added burden can be narrowed even further to include only those instances where the probate proceedings involve
wills which create interests in favor of "issue." The severity of
this burden can be lessened by the accounting trustee himself by,
for example, giving constructive notice to all potential claimants
by publishing a "citation against unknown persons"95 in a newspaper in the county in which the will is probated. Ease of administration of the estate has never been an overriding goal in the
construction of wills. 8 Where the intent of the testator is ambigu92. Id., 381 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
93. It should be noted that states may provide statutes of limitation in order to deal
with this issue. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 90 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). See also 3
BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 26.46 (Supp. 1976). This type of provision, which sets a
time limit for inheritance claims, would be equally applicable to claims by illegitimates
under the proposed statutory scheme. If a similar provision is not currently in effect in a
state adopting this scheme, the state may choose to incorporate one into the general
statute proposed herein.
94. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. Acr §§ 1003, 1403 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 197677).
95. A "citation against unknown persons" is a writ issued out of a court of competent
jurisdiction, commanding interested persons to appear on a day named to show cause why
a will should not be probated without their presence. See, e.g., Surrogate's Notices,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1976, at 24, col. 3.
96. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972): "But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." Id. at 656 (White, J.).
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ous with respect to the inclusion of illegitimates under a provision
"to issue," the courts have used traditional guidelines relating to
community standards to determine the testator's most likely intent. "
The problems involved in establishing standards of paternity
proof can best be minimized by the promulgation of a statute
which includes a uniform requirement for proof of paternity.
This would reduce the possibilities of fraudulent intrusion into
the bounty of legitimate heirs and would facilitate the trustee's
work. Such statutory pronouncement would set the level of proof
at a point between the strict paternity proof requirements of New
York's intestate inheritance statute for illegitimates99 and the
implied liberalization suggested in Hoffman. In this way, fraudulent claimants would be deterred from bringing suit because they
would be unable to carry this burden.
In sum, procedural problems exist in ferreting out fraud and
in accounting for illegitimates in the implementation of
Hoffman's holding. The extent of these problems, however, has
been greatly exaggerated. They may be minimized by appropriate actions by the trustee and may be nearly obviated by a rational, definitive statutory standard pertaining to the level of
paternity proof required.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES

A major justification for the Hoffman court's departure from
traditional common law dogma' regarding illegitimates is its
perception of an expansion of the scope of the equal protection
clause to include illegitimates. However, the court does not fully
explain the relationship between will construction proceedings,
which ascribe an intent to a testator, and equal protection of the
laws. The Hoffman opinion should have dealt with specific pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals on equal protection and illegitimates'
Tights in an analytical fashion. The poorly substantiated conclusion proffered in Hoffman, that the Constitution mandates a decision which treats illegitimates with equality, seems out-of-hand
and hence unconvincing. The Hoffman court failed even to men97. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
98. See text accompanying notes 154-164 infra.
99. N.Y. EST., PowEs & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967). For the text of
this provision, see note 49 supra.
100. See note 3 supra.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss3/8

44

Thaw: Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.

Illegitimates' Inheritance Rights

tion In re Estate of Lalli'0 and did no more than cite Labine v.
Vincent,'"2 two cases which reach contrary conclusions on this
issue. The unconstitutionality of a will construction against illegitimates in the absence of factual data was one of the two justifications for the outcome in Hoffman. This line of reasoning warrants
further examination and clarification.
Many courts and commentators have grappled with the
problem of applying equal protection concepts to discrimination
against illegitimates.'13 The impetus for this relatively new aware-

ness of the plight of illegitimates is a line of United States Supreme Court cases. In 1968, Levy v. Louisiana"°4 and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co."0 5 significantly
undermined the rules of construction that had discriminated
against illegitimates. Four attacks ' were made between 1968 and
1972 on Louisiana court decisions which had held that only legitimates were included within the words "child" or "children" in
statutes concerning wrongful death, workmen's compensation,
and descent and distribution. 7 It is noteworthy that the Court
101. 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
102. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
103. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges The Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisianaand Glona v. American Guarantee&Liability InsuranceCo., 118
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 479
(1974).
104. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy five illegitimate children brought an action for the
wrongful death of their mother. The state court held that the word "child" in the Louisiana wrongful death statute meant legitimate child only. The United States Supreme
Court held that illegitimates are persons within the meaning of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and thus this statutory interpretation denying them recovery creates an invidious discrimination. Id. at 70-71. A state may have broad powers in
promulgating classifications, but it cannot, consistently with the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, delineate groupings if this causes irrational discrimination
against a particular class. The response of the Court was partially due to its belief that
the state is precluded from denying rights to persons on the basis of a condition over which
they have no control. Id. at 72.
105. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). In Glona, decided the same day as Levy, the Court held that
Louisiana's wrongful death statute, which barred recovery to the parents of an illegitimate
child, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 76. This
decision rejected a traditionally espoused state interest - that of deterring the "sin" of
birth out of wedlock.
106. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
107. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967); Stokes
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Weber v.
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in Glona explicitly rejected the traditional state interest typically
used to justify discrimination against illegitimates: the state's
interest in maintaining family unity through deterrence of birth
out of wedlock.'"8 Thus, Levy and Glona marked the emergence
of a new right to equal protection.
A sharp reversal of this trend, however, occurred three years
later in Labine v. Vincent.' The Supreme Court, in a five-four
decision, affirmed a Louisiana state court decision denying an
illegitimate her inheritance rights. This illegitimate had lived
with and had been supported by her mother and father within
their family unit, had been formally acknowledged by them, and
was the only child of her father. The court approved a state statutory scheme which deprived illegitimates of the right to inherit
from their fathers through intestate succession."' Mr. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, deferred to Louisiana's interest
in promoting family life, directing the disposition of property,
and securing the stability of land titles within the state.", The
illegitimate claimant had argued that Levy and Glona supported
her right to inherit. The Supreme Court distinguished these prior
cases, noting that Levy and Glona sounded in tort while Labine
2
involved property rights."
The Court further justified its holding in Labine by suggesting that parents have the option to devise their property through
will provisions which specifically name the beneficiaries."' In
addition, parents have the option to marry and thereby legitimize
their children, enabling them to take through intestate succession."' Thus, reasoned the Court, this interpretation of the intestacy statute did not present an "insurmountable barrier" " ' to the
illegitimate's recovery. Mr. Justice Black asserted that statutory
discrimination in favor of legitimates and against illegitimates
was analogous to discrimination in favor of wives and against
concubines. He stated: "One set of relationships is socially sancAetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Succession of Vincent, 255 La. 480, 229 So.

2d 449 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. State, 192
So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1966), rev'd sub nom. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
108. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).

109. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 539.

114. Id.
115. Id.
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tioned, legally recognized and gives rise to various rights and
duties. The other set of relationships is illicit and beyond the
recognition of the law."'1' Mr. Justice Black, however, failed to
recognize the element of free choice available to concubines but
not to illegitimates.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the dissent in Labine, strongly
objected to the majority's conclusion that Louisiana's intestate
succession laws did not invidiously discriminate against illegitimates. Such laws, he determined, treat even illegitimates who are
publicly acknowledged by their fathers differently from legitimate children.' He characterized this discrimination as a reflection of "the untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone
centuries which vindictively punished not only the illegitimate's
parents, but also the hapless and innocent children.""' Mr. Justice Brennan, maintaining that the state interest in protecting
property within its borders was not overriding, cited a prior Supreme Court decision which held that the Constitution did not
commit the power to regulate intestate succession exclusively to
the states."' He therefore would have held that the minimal harm
done to the state interest if illegitimates were permitted to inherit would not outweigh the grave harm to the illegitimates if
they were not. His dissent systematically rejected the importance
of the state interests that both implicitly and explicitly justified
the majority's holding and that justified prior findings that discrimination against illegitimates was not invidious. Mr. Justice
Brennan disagreed with the basic premise that discrimination, to
be invidious, must present an "insurmountable barrier"'20 to recovery. He indicated that the barrier to recovery was not insur116. Id. at 538.
117. Id. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. This statement echoed the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), where he stated: "[it is invidious to discriminate against [the
Levy children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the
harm that was done the mother." Id. at 72 (footnote omitted).
119. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 548 n.16 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961)), which dealt with the power of Congress to regulate the
devolution of property upon the death of citizens of various states). The Court in United
States v. Oregon stated:
The fact that this [federal] law pertains to the devolution of property does not
render it invalid. Although it is true that this is an area normally left to the
States, it is not immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the
Federal Government which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the
exercise of a delegated power.
366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
120. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 550 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mountable in Levy, where recovery was permitted, since the illegitimate there could have been acknowledged by his parents to
meet the statutory requirements. 2' The dissent further did not
agree that the state interest in protecting the family unit justified
requiring formalities, such as the marriage of the parents, to allow
the children to recover. The dissenting Justice asserted that the
need for these formalities to insure family unity was lacking
where the child had been acknowledged by his parents. 22 He
proposed that any state interest in promoting the marital union
should focus on the parents who, unlike the children, are capable
of entering into this union and who alone are capable of agreeing
to assume its attendant responsibilities. Mr. Justice Brennan
stated that the state interest in promoting marriage "can obviously be attained far more directly by focusing on the parents,
whose actions the State seeks to influence.' 2 3
Finding further justification for his position in the facts of
Labine, Justice Brennan declared that when paternity has been
formally acknowledged, the state's interest in eliminating complicated questions of paternity proof is vitiated. 4 He also pointed
out that one purported state interest, the promotion of marriage
and family life, is at odds with another purported state interest,
implementation of the average testator's desire to exclude illegitimates. To encourage marriage by a denial of rights to children
born out of wedlock, it must be assumed that parents ordinarily
desire to leave property to their illegitimate children. This is
wholly contrary to the intestacy statute's presumption concerning
the average testator's intent.' One district court'28 doubted the
continuing vitality of the Labine decision, suggesting that the
four-Justice' 21 dissenting opinion is more persuasive and more
consonant with the Court's current stance.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,' the Supreme
Court invalidated a section of Louisiana's workmen's compensa121. Id.
122. Id. at 556.
123. Id. at 558.
124. Id. at 552.
125. Id. at 555-56.
126. Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 (D. Md. 1973) (dictum). This
decision involved an illegitimate's claim for benefits under the Social Security Act. The
court upheld the requirement of proof of prior support or dependency, which was the basis
of the denial of this claim below.
127. Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the dissenting opinion in Labine. He has since
retired from the Supreme Court.
128. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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tion law which denied dependent, unacknowledged illegitimates
the right to share equally with acknowledged illegitimate children
and legitimate children. The Court in Weber followed Levy's
proscription of discrimination against illegitimate dependent
children," 9 and found no rational basis for this discrimination.
At the same time, the Court in Weber affirmed the general principle of equality for illegitimates set forth in Levy 3 ' while upholding discrimination against illegitimates in the specific area of
inheritance rights. 3 ' This case also clarified the nature of the
equal protection inquiry into discrimination against illegitimates.
Mr. Justice Powell, writing the majority opinion, articulated a
standard of constitutionality involving a comparison of the harms
engendered by each of the competing interests and a balancing
of those interests.'32 This Court sought to reject the proposition
that categorization of and discrimination against illegitimates is
rational because the "illegitimacy" label incorporates within it
rational bases for discrimination. Here, the rational bases included the closeness of family ties and the dependency of the
illegitimate on his father. 3' If dependency and closeness of ties
are indeed rational bases for differential treatment, these core
factors should not be obscured by the overinclusive
"illegitimacy" label. The Court in Weber also echoed Glona's
rejection of the priority of the state interest in deterring illicit
unions over providing benefits to illegitimates. 4
The New York Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Lalli' 5
responded to this sequence of Supreme Court cases by upholding
129. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
130. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
131. This distinction between inheritance rights and the right to bring a wrongful
death action was first set forth by the majority in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 53536. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
132. Mr. Justice Powell articulated this two-pronged test, inquiring: "What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?" Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173
(1972).
133. See id. The Court in Weber indicated that in a workmen's compensation

scheme, where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to recovery, it is irrelevant
whether legitimates are more likely to be within the ambit of familial care and affection.

Id.
134. The Weber majority stated: "'It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that

women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their
death.' . . . Nor can it be thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the
offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation." 406 U.S. 164,
173 (1972) (quoting Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968)).
135. 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
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a New York statutory restriction on illegitimates' inheritance
rights regarding paternity proof requirements.': This statpte,
strict in comparison with those of other states, 37 requires a. court
order of filiation which often bars claims by "issue" who could
otherwise convincingly document paternity. 3 ' Furthermore, this
section's strict paternity proof requirement penalizes the illegitimate children of those fathers who do not dispute paternity and
who willingly provide child support during their lifetimes. Paternity suits which result in orders of filiation are invariably instituted only when the father refuses to support the child.'39 The
Lalli court repudiated appellant's equal protection claim under
state and federal constitutions, drawing a distinction between the
rights accruing by virtue of the biological relationship to the parent and the rights arising by virtue of the subjective desires of the
parents. The court reasoned that claims based on wrongful death,
on the right to parental support, and on workmen's compensation
laws belong in the former category, "' and thus merit considerable
protection. It reasoned that inheritance claims, on the other
hand, need not be examined with strict scrutiny because they fall
within the latter category. This category is comprised of claims
136. N.Y. EST., POWERS & Tausws LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967). For the full
text of this provision, see note 49 supra.
137. Three states go so far as to grant illegitimates equal rights of inheritance from
the father regardless of acknowledgment: ARIZ. Rav. STAT. § 14-2109 (1973); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.105, 109.060 (1963). Numerous states
allow acknowledged illegitimate children to inherit equally from their fathers without
requiring an order of filiation. E.g., CAL. PROS. CODE § 255 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-11-611, 15-11-109 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633-222 (West 1964); IDAHO Con § 14-104
(1976); KAN. STAT. § 59-501 (1975); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.04.081 (1967); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 1976). A small number of
states expressly provide that the illegitimate child may not inherit from his father. E.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-14 (1968); Ky. Rav. STAT. § 391-090 (1972) (providing for no
inheritance from the father unless he has married the mother); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2107 (Purdon 1975).
138. In re Estate of Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975),
presented a claimant who could convincingly document paternity by means other than a
court order of filiation. The decedent had provided financial support for the illegitimate
and had given parental consent for the illegitimate's marriage, thereby acknowledging his
son before a notary public. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals rejected this
claim because an order of filiation had not been entered. Id. at 79, 340 N.E.2d at 722, 378
N.Y.S.2d at 352. Accord, Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
901 (1970); In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1970).
139. R. Roth, InheritanceRights of Illegitimates, 177 N.Y.L.J., 11 at 1, col. 1 (Jan.
17, 1977).
140. In re Estate of Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 80-81, 340 N.E.2d 721, 723, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351,
354 (1975).
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based solely on an illegitimate's "inchoate expectancy."' 4 ' The
latter category requires greater deference to state interests in its
review of the means chosen to accomplish a state objective. Once
the Lalli court established this categorization of rights and corresponding levels of scrutiny, based in large part on Labine v.
Vincent, 2 it then had no difficulty finding a rational relationship
between the order of filiation requirement and the valid state
objective of minimizing fraud and administrative burdens.
Various other courts have interpreted Labine very differently.' There is no consensus as to the standard to be applied
in reviewing the constitutionality of classifications based on illegitimacy in the inheritance area. One commentator has posited
that in nearly all instances, classifications based on legitimacy
alone are either unrelated to any proper legislative purpose, or,
if related, are grossly over or underinclusive. 1" This is a fair
characterization of the rationality of classifications based solely
on the happenstance of birth. The argument that discrimination
is justified because of the state's interests in fostering family
unity and in deterring illicit unions is a weak one today. In fact,
the Supreme Court has rejected this rationale."' It is vindictive
141. Id. at 81, 340 N.E.2d at 723, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
142. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
143. See, e.g., Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County 1974), where the court decided, after Labine v. Vincent, that when
Ohio's descent and distribution statute was expanded to include inheritance by illegitimates from and through their mothers, inheritance from their fathers was mandated by
the equal protection clause. Id. at 113-14, 318 N.E.2d at 406. The court distinguished
Labine, noting that Ohio's statutory scheme involved discrimination within the class of
illegitimates, whereas the Louisiana statute at issue in Labine involved total discrimination against all inheritance by illegitimates, both through the mother and through the
father. Id. at 112-13, 318 N.E.2d at 405-06. This same distinguishing factor may be present
in In re Estate of Lalli. The court in Green declared that the paternity proof problem can
be overcome by requiring clear and convincing evidence, which is not necessarily limited
to an order of filiation. Id. at 116, 318 N.E.2d at 407. Compare Green with Moore v. Dague,
46 Ohio App. 2d 75, 345 N.E.2d 449 (Ct. App. Franklin County 1975), which required a
higher standard of paternity proof under the same Ohio statute and under facts similar
to those of Green v. Woodard. The court in Moore rejected the standard set forth in its
neighboring county in Green, because it rejected the concept of two classes of children
created by the Ohio statute. Id. at 80, 345 N.E.2d at 452. Moore found that intra-class
discrimination had existed in the Louisiana statute involved in Labine v. Vincent and
thus could not distinguish Labine on that basis. Id. at 80-81, 345 N.E.2d at 452-53.
144. H. KRAUSE,ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SocIAL POLIcY 84 (1971). Accord, Butcher v.
Pollard, 32 Ohio App. 2d 1, 14, 288 N.E.2d 204, 212-13 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1972);
Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1969).
145. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
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to punish children for the acts of their parents, and the deterrent
effect on the parents is at best remote. Such deterrence is made
more remote today by the widespread availability of birth control
information and devices which have tended to sever, or at least
weaken, the once inextricable link between sexual relations and
procreation.
The justification that illegitimacy is a rational classification
because it embraces factors reasonably related to illegitimates'
inheritance rights has been criticized. 4 ' The rational bases for
differential treatment themselves, rather than the classification
by an overinclusive term such as "illegitimates," are superior
indicia of the nature of each particular parent-child relationship.
These bases include dependency upon parental support and habitation of the child in the parents' household.
Doubt has already been cast upon the importance of the state
interest in the property and security of land titles within its borders by the dissent in Labine.'4 7 This purportedly crucial state
interest in land has its roots in an earlier feudal society. 4 ' Land
was then the primary source of wealth and the basis of the entire
feudal economy and hierarchical structure."' By necessity, the
governmental interest in protecting this basic source of wealth in
that era overrode the interest in protecting the rights of illegitimates. Today, the primary emphasis of our economy is divorced
from the physical land. 5 ' The power structure of society is no
longer based entirely upon the level of control over parcels of
land. 15 ' Hence, the importance of a state's interest in the land
within its borders has proportionately decreased. Moreover, not
all wills with provisions "to issue" nor all dispositions of property
through intestate succession involve dispositions of interests in
land. Therefore, to override an illegitimate's compelling personal
interest in favor of a blanket rule, rooted in outdated notions
concerning land disposition, would be a most unsatisfactory
weighing of the modern competing interests involved.
146. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
147. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
148. See Butcher v. Pollard, 32 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5, 288 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County 1972).
149. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY, 223-24 (2d ed. 1969).
150. Id.
151. Id. The authors state that today land in the United States plays the role of a
basic commodity of commerce. Our land is not and never has been tied up in families on
a large scale. No longer is tenure between lord and tenant a dominant institution as it
was in feudal times.
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Assuming that discrimination against illegitimates in inheritance is less pernicious than discrimination against illegitimates
in other areas, a distinction must nevertheless be made between
inheritance through intestacy and inheritance through a will
provision "to issue." The majority in Labine espoused one rationale to justify preclusion of the illegitimate's inheritance by intestate succession: Illegitimacy did not present an "insurmountable
barrier" to inheritance. 2 The Court reasoned that the decedent
could have provided for this illegitimate by will. In the case of a
will construction proceeding, a decedent has already exercised his
prerogative by making a will. He may think that by leaving property "to issue" he has fully provided for all heirs, both legitimate
and illegitimate. It would be unfair to impose retroactively a duty
of explicit specificity on the testator regarding the type of issue
designated to inherit. The testator might well have assumed that
changing societal attitudes toward illegitimates would serve automatically to include illegitimates in a general provision "to
issue." Therefore, the imposition of this retroactive duty may be
so unfair as to constitute an "insurmountable barrier" '53 to inheritance.
PROPOSED REMEDY

In analyzing the importance of the various state interests
asserted to justify discrimination against illegitimates, it seems
fair to conclude that the only interest bearing a logical, direct
relationship to a basic characteristic of illegitimacy is the state
interest in preventing fraud and undue probate burden and uncertainty.'54 This state interest is significant where the complex
issue of proof of paternity is present; this justification is lacking,
however, where paternity has been satisfactorily established.
Therefore, our aim should be to facilitate proof of paternity, thus
permitting illegitimates to claim their due share of inheritances
while maintaining an adequate standard of proof to deter fraudulent claims. The Hoffman court left the requirement for proof of
paternity in this situation completely unclear.
The optimal solution to the problems raised by Hoffman,
therefore, is the formulation of an inheritance law which creates
a uniform paternity proof requirement. Such a statute should also
152. 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971).
153. Id.
154. See Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 901 (1970);
In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1970).
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set an effective date when all illegitimates, whose paternity has
been sufficiently proven, will inherit on a par with legitimates.
Further, the statute should lessen the administrator's burden by
requiring him to publish, when reasonably necessary, a "citation
against unknown persons" as constructive notice to all claimants
thereafter. This would strengthen the vulnerable precedent of
Hoffman and would speed the amelioration of the illegitimates'
plight. This type of broad, coordinated legislation would indeed
be superior to the present piecemeal approach of judicial action, 155 which, as exemplified by Hoffman, can only solve the
illegitimate's inheritance problems in small, precarious steps.
While decisions will vary from court to court,'56 statutes are more
uniformly applied. Moreover, this subject matter is too complex
to be amenable to patchwork treatment. Judicial liberalization is
also inferior because it may clash with prior statutory pronouncements. 57 Further, it is simpler to mandate only prospective appli58
cation with a statute.1
The most efficient mode of implementing the equality which
the Constitution and Hoffman demand would be through federal
legislation.'59 As one commentator asserts, however, this is "a
political improbability."'' 0 Hence, the following proposed statute,
which combines the clearest and most progressive equality
provisions of state enactments 6 ' and the Uniform Probate
Code, 6"' is offered to the states to solve the difficult problems
raised by Hoffman. It is suggested that the following standard for
ascertainment of paternity will minimize the potential for fraudulent claims while accommodating valid inheritance claims in
cases in which no order of filiation has been entered.6 3
155. See Krause, Bringing The BastardInto The Great Society-A ProposedUniform
Act On Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829 (1966).
156. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
157. See text accompanying notes 49-63 supra.
158. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
159. H. KRAUSE, ILLEOTMAcy: LAW AND SOCIAL POLCY 239 (1971).
160. Id.
161. This statutory formulation is derived from a careful examination of N.D. CENT.
CODE § 56-01-05 (1969), replaced by N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1975); Awz. REv. STAT.
§ 14.2109 (1973) (repealing AiZ. REV. STAT. § 14-206 (1956)); and OR. REV. STAT. §§

112.105, 109.060 (1963).
162. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (official text 1969).
163. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy and Inheritance
Rights

164

1. Legitimacy of children or issue; power to inherit
Pursuant to the requirements of section 2 herein, every child
shall be deemed issue of his natural parents and will inherit from
them and their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same
manner as children born in lawful wedlock.

2. Requisite Proof of Parentage
If, for purposes of intestate succession and taking by will, a
relationship between parent and child must be established to
determine succession by, through, or from a person,
(a) A person born out of wedlock is the child of the mother.
That person is also a child of the father, providing
(1) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the
attempted marriage is void; or
(2)(A) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear
and convincing proof. Such proof may include, but is not limited
to, the following elements:
(1) dependency upon the father during the father's lifetime
(2) voluntary acknowledgment of the child during the father's lifetime.
(3) habitation by the child in the father's household during
the father's lifetime
(B) The paternity established under subparagraph (A)
is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from
or through the child unless the father has openly treated the
child as his own and has not refused to support the child.
3.

Will Construction - Testator's Intent
The definition of issue in section 1 shall be presumed to

164. The inheritance statute is the author's own; however, a comprehensive, uniform
proposal dealing with all facets of illegitimates' rights may be the most advisable course
of action. See Krause, BringingThe BastardInto The Great Society-A ProposedUniform
Act On Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. Rv. 829 (1966). The proposal contains detailed provisions
regarding parental support, id. at 834, workmen's compensation and wrongful death recovery, id. at 836, standards of proof of paternity, id. at 837, effect of acknowledgement by
the parent and the right of inheritance, id. at 835. However, a statute focusing only upon
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apply in the construction of testator's intent, absent factual evidence indicating the contrary, when testator has created an interest in favor of such relative.
4.

Constructive Notice to Possible Claimants

When facts exist which would reasonably cause the accounting trustee, estate executor, or estate administrator to believe
that unknown illegitimates share an interest in the estate in controversy, he/she shall be required to publish a citation against
unknown persons in a newspaper in the county in which the will
is being probated or give other equivalent constructive notice to
possible claimants.
5.

Effective Date

The provisions of this Act will take effect on (date). This Act
shall not apply to wills already probated nor property already
taken by intestate succession. Prior provisions of law shall apply
to wills probated or estates administered prior to the effective
date of this statute.
CONCLUSION"6 5

The Hoffman opinion should be upheld by the courts because
of the importance of the principles set forth within it. The crucial
related questions unanswered by Hoffman may be dealt with and
guidelines may be formulated by later, more comprehensive judicial treatment. However, the superior resolution of the problems
and inconsistencies arising from Hoffman is legislation that will
operate in coordination with other existing statutes to treat illegitimates and legitimates with equality. It is strongly urged that
legislatures take the initiative in this meritorious pursuit by
adopting a statute similar to the one proposed in this note.
Susan A. Mills
the crucial area of inheritance rights is most immediately necessary because of the problems raised and unanswered by Hoffman. This holds true not only for New York, but for
most other jurisdictions as well because of the ambiguity or regressiveness of the law
regarding illegitimates' inheritance rights.
165. As this note went to press, the Supreme Court held that Illinois' intestary statutes unconstitutionally precludes illegitimates from inheriting from their fathers. Trimble
v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1977) (No. 75-5952). This decision further
discredits other state inheritance statutes, including New York's which similarly discriminates.
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IN RE FLYING MAILMEN SERVICE, INC.
Corporate Stock Repurchases-A secured selling stockholder does not have priority over subsequent
creditors unless the U.C. C. § 9-402 financing statement expressly
recites the nature of the underlying transaction.539 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1976).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in deciding In
re Flying Mailmen Service, Inc., I has added a new qualification
SECURED TRANSACTIONS-

to the U.C.C. § 9-4022 notice filing provision. Now an Article 9

financing statement does not constitute sufficient notice to subsequent creditors if the underlying transaction is a stock repurchase
agreement.
Flying Mailmen Service, Inc. was a closely held corporation
which, while solvent, had contracted with appellant, a shareholder, to repurchase his stock in return for a settlement of appellant's claims against the corporation.3 The corporation paid a
substantial amount upon the execution of the agreement. The
balance was to be paid in installments over a three-year period.
Pursuant to this transaction, appellant acquired a security interest in the corporation's assets to secure the installment payments.4 Appellant then perfected the security interest by filing
1. 539 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1) provides in relevant part:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a
mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or
describing the items, of collateral.
It must be noted that New York has not yet adopted the 1972 revisions to the Official Text
of Article 9, U.C.C. § 9-402 (62-1/2 McKinney 1964). Because the same result and analysis
would apply had the 1972 revision been adopted in New York, the 1972 Official Text of
Article 9 is used herein.
3. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1976). Appellant was a 49%
stockholder, who received a stock repurchase agreement and security interest in the corporate assets in return for diminution of his claims for dissolution of the company.
4. Id. at 868.
5. There are two crucial steps in a secured transaction: attachment and perfection.
Attachment (U.C.C. § 9-203) occurs when there is either a written security agreement or
possession of the collateral by the secured party pursuant to agreement, value is given to
the debtor, and the debtor obtains rights in the collateral. When a security interest
attaches it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral. Under
the 1962 version of the U.C.C. it is possible to have an attached security interest which is
not enforceable. This is not possible in those states that have adopted the 1972 Official
Text of Article 9, wherein both attachment and enforceability are combined within U.C.C.
§ 9-203. Perfection is the process by which the secured party gains priority over third party
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a U.C.C. § 9-402 financing statement. After appellant received
slightly over fifty percent of the agreed purchase price, the corporation filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.'
Appellant then instituted an action in bankruptcy court for enforcement of the security agreement upon default by the corporation.
The controlling statutes concerning stock repurchases in
New York clearly indicate that a corporation can lawfully purchase its own shares provided such a transaction would not render
the corporation insolvent or cause a net worth deficit.' Thus,
although it was initially valid, the stock repurchase agreement
became invalid at the time of the corporation's insolvency.
The court of appeals interpreted the holding of the bankruptcy court and the subsequent decision of the district court on
review to be that a security interest "given to secure an unenforceable obligation, is likewise unenforceable." 8 Appellant contended, and the court of appeals agreed, that under New York
case law the rights of creditors who extend credit subsequent to
the execution of a stock repurchase agreement are not superior to
the selling stockholder if the subsequent creditors had "notice"
of the prior stock repurchase.' Nevertheless, the majority, in subordinating appellant's claim to that of subsequent creditors, held
claimants in the same collateral, most commonly subsequent lien creditors including the
trustee in bankruptcy. A common method of perfection is the filing of a financing statement pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-402. Part 4 of Article 9 deals with the Code's filing provisions.
Perfection can also be accomplished in certain instances by taking possession of the
collateral as provided in U.C.C. § § 9-304 and 9-305. Finally, the Code provides for automatic perfection in certain cases; the most significant of which is the automatic perfection
of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
6. Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).
7. The current controlling statutes concerning stock repurchases in New York are
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1963), which states: "A corporation, subject to
any restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, may purchase its own shares,
or redeem its redeemable shares, out of surplus except when currently the corporation is
insolvent or would thereby be made insolvent"; and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.35(1)(e)
(McKinney 1975), which states: "A person is guilty of misconduct by corporate official
when: 1. Being a director of a stock corporation, he knowingly concurs in any vote ...
by which it is intended: . . . (e) [To apply any portion of the funds of such corporation,
directly or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock, except in the manner
provided by law .... "
8. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1976). Unenforceable,
as used by the court, was obviously not meant in the Article 9 sense. See note 5 supra.
9. The rights of subsequent creditors with notice of the prior stock repurchase were
in fact subordinated to that of the selling stockholder. See Huron Milling Co. v. Hedges,
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that the U.C.C. § 9-402 notice filing provision was intended to
cover only "normal valid commercial transactions."10 Because a
stock repurchase depletes corporate assets without any valuable
consideration to the corporation," the court reasoned that the
repurchase was not a normal commercial transaction. Accordingly, the court held that subsequent creditors had not been given
sufficient notice, 2 notwithstanding that appellant had complied
fully with U.C.C. § 9-402. In so holding, the Second Circuit has
imposed an additional requirement to the filing of a financing
statement: If the underlying transaction is a stock repurchase
agreement, it must be disclosed in the financing statement in
13
order to constitute sufficient notice to subsequent creditors.
Present statutory limitations 4 on the repurchase of stock by
a corporation evolved from the common law "no prejudice" rule. 5
This rule provided, in essence, that once a corporation became
insolvent, a repurchase of its shares was no longer permissible
because such a transaction would prejudice the rights of
creditors." Stock repurchases by insolvent corporations, considered fraudulent conveyances of assets, were thus voidable. 7 The
"no prejudice" rule, however, did not provide for deferred payment situations. It was not resolved whether the repurchasing
corporation had to be solvent as of the date of the repurchase
agreement or as of the date of each installment payment.'" A
majority of decisions' 9 insisted on solvency at the time of each
payment. If a corporation became insolvent at the time an installcould not require
ment payment was due, the selling stockholder
2
further payment by the corporation. 1
257 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Dawson Bros. Constr. Co., 218 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y.
1963); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378 (1929).
10. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1976).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 871. See text accompanying note 39 infra and note 40 infra.
13. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 871 (2d Cir. 1976). U.C.C. § 9402 has no such requirement. See note 2 supra.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. See Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 303, 305 (1965).
16. Id. at 306.
17. Hartmann & Wilson, Payment for RepurchasedShares under the Texas Business
CorporationAct, 26 Sw. L.J. 725, 728 (1972).
18. Herwitz, supra note 15, at 307.
19. See McConnel v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Trimble Co.,
339 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1964); Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935); In re
Peoples Loan & Inv. Co., 316 F. Supp. 13 (1970).
20. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935).
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Illustrative of this approach is Robinson v. Wangemann,2 a
Fifth Circuit decision in which the court subordinated a claim
against a bankrupt corporation on a note given by the corporation
for the repurchase of some of its stock. The contrary viewpoint,
best expressed in Wolff v. HeidritterLumber Co., 2 was that if a
corporation was fully able to repurchase its shares at the outset
and instead gave a note, the selling stockholder was in effect a
general creditor and should be given creditor status. The Wolff
approach was adopted by few jurisdictions. Most courts accepted
the logic of Robinson, and the "insolvency cutoff" rule of that
23
case is firmly entrenched in decisional law today.
It is against this common law background that statutory limitations on corporate stock repurchases developed. The problems
that arose with respect to deferred purchase price and installment
payment obligations in the statutorily regulated area were similar
to those which had arisen in common law insolvency. It was necessary to determine whether an adequate surplus must exist at
the time of executing the repurchase agreement or at the time of
each installment payment. Current statutes typically limit the
corporation's ability to repurchase shares by requiring that such
repurchases be made from some form of surplus.24
New York courts have paralleled the insolvency cutoff reasoning of Robinson in the construction of statutory surplus requirements." In re FechheimerFishel Co. 5 is illustrative. In that
case the court, pointing out that the capital of a corporation is a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors, held that a surplus must
exist at the time of each installment payment.2
In Flying Mailmen the parties did not dispute the validity of
the initial agreement. In fact, it was understood that if the surplus degenerated into a deficit or if the corporation became insolvent, the agreement would become invalid and the corporation
would not be required to pay the agreed installments. Indeed, to
21. Id.
22. 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140 (Ch. 1932).
23. Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 17, at 729. See note 25 infra and accompanying
text.
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 513(a) (McKinney 1963); CAL. CORP. CoDE §§
1707-1708 (West 1955).
25. In reFechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F. 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 760 (1914).
See also Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953);
Richards v. Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N.Y. 59, 100 N.E. 592, 129 N.Y.S. 951 (1912).
26. 212 F. 357 (2d Cir. 1914).
27. Id. at 366.
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do so would be unlawful. Appellant, however, did not claim a
cause of action against Flying Mailmen Service, Inc., but instead
sought enforcement of the security interest upon default. Flying
Mailmen thus presented a question which was an extension of the
deferred payment dilemma encountered in the construction of
surplus limitation statutes. The Second Circuit, then, confronted
the problem of a security interest arising from a stock repurchase
agreement at a point when the repurchase agreement itself was
rendered invalid because of a subsequent insolvency.
Commentators have noted that a mortgage given in connection with a stock repurchase agreement will not validate the
agreement in the case of insolvency.2 The reason for this insolvency cutoff rule is to prevent injury to creditors by giving them
priority status in relation to stockholders.2 9 Accordifgly, courts
have been inclined to invalidate security interests securing payment of stock repurchases where an installment payment would
be unlawful. The reasoning is simply an extension of the insolvency cutoff logic.
New York courts nevertheless have carved out an exception
to the priority status afforded creditors over selling stockholders.
Where subsequent creditors have notice of the underlying stock
repurchase contract, they cannot claim priority over the selling
stockholder." The apparent rationale for this rule is that subsequent creditors will not be prejudiced provided they have notice.
Notice enables subsequent creditors to ascertain the nature of the
underlying transaction prior to any extension of credit.
Appellant, in Flying Mailmen, claimed that subsequent
creditors had such notice by the filing of a U.C.C. § 9-402 financing statement. Thus, the real issue was not the validity of a corporate stock repurchase agreement but, rather, the enforceability of
a perfected security interest. In this regard appellant relied on
Cross v. Beguelin,3 1 in which the New York Court of Appeals
stated:
28. Herwitz, supra note 15, at 325. For the few subscribers to the Wolff view this
may not be the case, because the validity of the repurchase agreement would be determined at the outset. In Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d
241 (1967), the court, in construing a surplus statute, followed the reasoning in Wolff.
Priority was given to a recorded chattel mortgage which secured a deferred payment on a
stock repurchase agreement.
29. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935).
30. See note 9 supra.

31. 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378 (1929). This case arose prior to the enactment of N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1963) and N.Y. PENA LAw § 190.35 (McKinney 1975).
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[Tihis claim is not against the corporation. It is directed
against assets in possession of a creditors committee. The corporation, for all that the submission shows, is still a going concern
with the ownership of all the stock in the possession of [a subsequent purchaser]. The corporation appears to have no interest
in this controversy.2

The majority in Flying Mailmen first observed" that this
passage may not be valid since the enactment of section 513(a)
of the New York Business Corporation Law. Section 513(a), 3'
however, only regulates a corporation's repurchase of its own
shares. The section does not deal with the validity of underlying
security interests, nor does it purport to resolve priority problems.
In light of In re FechheimerFishel Co.,3" the court further determined that the above quoted language from Cross is inapplicable
to a trustee in bankruptcy. Fechheimer was a bankruptcy case
involving a sham debenture bond which was issued by the corporation to one of its officers. The court held that the bond had the
characteristic features of preferred stock and treated it as such."
The bond was surrendered to the corporation in exchange for a
note, apparently to evade a provision of the bond making it subordinate to the rights of general creditors. The original debenture
bond was preferred stock for all practical purposes and, therefore,
the characteristics of preferred stock attached to the note. The
court concluded that the creditors had priority under the provisions of section 664 of the New York Penal Law," which made it
a misdemeanor for a director of a corporation to apply any funds,
except surplus, to purchase shares of its own stock.
The governing statute at that time was N.Y. PENAL LAw § 664 (McKinney 1909) (repealed
1967):
A director of a stock corporation, who concurs in any vote or act of the directors
of such corporation, or any of them, by which it is intended ... (5) To apply
any portion of the funds of such corporation, except surplus, directly or indi[i]s guilty of a misderectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock, ...
meanor.
32. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 265-66, 169 N.E. 378, 379 (1929).
33. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1976).
34. See note 7 supra.
35. 212 F. 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 760 (1914).
36. It rhust be noted that this case was decided prior to Cross v. Beguelin. The New
York Court of Appeals in Cross cited Fechheimerwith approval only for the proposition
that a stock repurchase agreement becomes unenforceable as against the corporation if
the corporation lacks the required surplus. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 265, 169 N.E.
378, 379 (1929). The Cross court did not read Fechheimer as the majority in Flying
Mailmen did. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
37. In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F. 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1914).
38. See note 31 supra.
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There was no contention in Fechheimer that the creditors
had either actual or constructive notice of the stock repurchase.
Since the obligation was not secured, there was no filing as in
Flying Mailmen. Cross reverses the priority status of subsequent
creditors; when they have notice of the stock repurchase, their
interests are subordinated to those of the selling stockholder. 9 On
the issue of notice, appellant relied on another passage in Cross,
wherein the New York Court of Appeals stated that
the real issue now is between Ferdinand Cross, as a prior creditor, and the Beguelin estate, as a subsequent creditor for salary
arrears and also as a holder of preferred stock. The rights of
creditors are, of course, superior to those of stockholders. The
rights of the seller of the stock appear to be superior to those of
subsequent creditors of the corporation who became such with
notice of the purchase by the corporationof its own stock.4
Thus, the majority in Flying Mailmen seemingly read
Fechheimer out of context and concluded that selling stockholders can never have a cause of action against assets in the hands
of a creditors' committee. Fechheimershould apply only in situations outside the Cross notice exception. It is therefore difficult
to see how Fechheimerrelates to an action such as that in Flying
Mailmen, where a selling stockholder brought an action against
subsequent creditors who had notice.
In Flying Mailmen appellant contended that the notice provided by the filing of a financing statement pursuant to U.C.C.
§ 9-402 constituted adequate notice to subsequent creditors
within the meaning of Cross. Appellant, in consideration for the
diminution of his claims to dissolve the corporation as well as the
transfer of all rights and title to his stock to the corporation,
entered into a stock repurchase agreement and received a security
interest in all assets owned by the corporation. This is clearly a
consensual security interest within the province of Article 9.41
39. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
40. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 266, 169 N.E. 378, 379 (1929) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that recently the New York Court of Appeals decided Chase Manhattan
Bank v. State of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 357 N.E.2d 366, 388 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1976),
which held that the filing of a U.C.C. financing statement did not constitute actual notice
to the State of New York. The case involved the assignment of a contract right against
the State of New York pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-318, which requires actual notification to
the account debtor (therein the State of New York). In Flying Mailmen the actual notice
requirement of U.C.C. § 9-318 is not present and the constructive notice afforded by the
filing of a U.C.C. financing statement should be sufficient.
41. See note 5 supra.
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Article 9 is applicable "to any transaction, regardless of its
form, which is intended to create a security interest in personal
A security interest is defined by the U.C.C. as
property .... ,,"2
"an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." 3 Thus, it seems beyond
dispute that Article 9 must apply to the secured sales aspect of
this case. Yet the majority considered the U.C.C. "inapplicable
and insufficient"" in the context of the case.
The court reasoned that a stock repurchase was not the type
of transaction for which the notice filing provisions of the U.C.C.
were drafted:
In contrast to the normal valid commercial transactionsfor
which UCC's innovation of notice filing was devised, a repurchase of stock depletes a corporation's assets without any consideration of value to creditors moving to the corporation in
return. Such cases as there are reflect a recognition of the unusual character of such transactions and hence suggest a distinction between the notice required to prevent subsequent
creditors from challenging a security created in connection with
an obligation that was and remains valid and the notice required to subordinate subsequent creditors to a lien securing an
obligation that is no longer enforceable against the corporation.4 5
The court, however, did not adequately define what constitutes
a "normal valid commercial transaction." Whether the underlying transaction is valid as against the corporation should not be
determinative. The majority was of the opinion that the U.C.C.
applies to valid claims as against an obligor, but Flying Mailmen
presented a Cross-type situation, that is, one in which a claim has
become invalid and thus a special exception operates in favor of
the obligee.1 To have priority, the selling stockholder must,
among other things,4 7 give some form of notice to subsequent
creditors. Whether the underlying transaction is itself valid"
should not affect the security interest in this type of situation.
In Cross, where the subsequent creditor had actual notice of
42. U.C.C. § 9-102.
43. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
supra.

In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 871 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
Id. at 871.
See note 5 supra.
The validity of the underlying transaction is determined by statute. See note 7

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss3/8

64

Thaw: Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.

Notice Filing

the stock repurchase contract,49 the court relied on FirstTrust Co.
v. Illinois CentralR.R.50 for the notice proposition. In First Trust
Co. a recorded mortgage specifically stated that the underlying
transaction was a stock repurchase agreement.5 1 The case did not
deal with a financing statement because the U.C.C. was not in
effect at the time. According to the majority in Flying Mailmen,
it would not have mattered if the U.C.C. had been in effect, for
the court read the decision in First Trust Co. as turning on the
fact that the mortgage specifically recited that the underlying
transaction was a stock repurchase contract. 5
The court in Flying Mailmen cited two other cases which
dealt with the effect of a recorded instrument. In the first of these,
In re Dawson Brothers Construction Co., 3 a selling stockholder
relied on the fact that the bankrupt corporation had filed the
required documents to reduce its capital. 4 The documents, however, did not give creditors notice of the outstanding obligation
contemporaneously created. 5 That situation is inapposite to the
facts of Flying Mailmen, where notice of the obligation was
given. The second case, In re Bay Ridge Inn, Inc., "6 can also be
distinguished from the present case in several respects. In Bay
Ridge a chattel mortgage was given by a corporation to secure the
purchase price of its stock. The mortgage, however, was misleading in that it falsely recited that it was given to secure loans by
the stockholders. 57 The court therefore held that the mortgage
was not sufficient notice to subsequent creditors." It does not
necessarily follow that in general the filing of a mortgage should
not serve as constructive notice to subsequent creditors, although
the Flying Mailmen majority seemed to infer this from the case.
There may have been other reasons why the court in Bay Ridge
rejected the mortgage. First, the stock was purchased by a third
party. 9 Thus, there was no consideration moving to the corporation because it was not even getting its stock back. In addition,
49. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 264, 169 N.E. 378 (1929).
50. 256 F. 830 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 615 (1919).

51. Id. at 831.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1976).
218 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
Id. at 413.
Id.
98 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1938).
Id. at 86.

58. Id.
59. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

65

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

at the time the notes and chattel mortgage were delivered by the
corporation, it did not have the required surplus to make the
purchase. 0 This differs from the facts in Flying Mailmen."
The foregoing cases were offered by the majority to illustrate
that the notice requirement will vary with the type of transaction.
Specifically, the court relied on these cases for the principle that
U.C.C. Article 9 notice is insufficient in a stock repurchase situation. 2 These cases fail, however, to demonstrate that U.C.C. Article 9 is "inadequate and inapplicable""3 to a stock repurchase
transaction.
Appellant's claim is against a subsequent creditor, herein the
trustee in bankruptcy. Thus, compliance with Article 9 is all that
should be required. Appellant had perfected by filing a financing
statement pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-402.11 This, the majority determined, was not sufficient: The underlying nature of the
transaction must be disclosed in the case of a stock repurchase.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mulligan stated: "There is no such
requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code and there is no
60. Id.
61. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 871.
63. Id.
64. See note 2 supra. See also Mahon, U.C.C. and the Courts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23,
1976, at 1, col. 1. Professor Mahon has noted that the financing statment upon which the
entire case turned mistakenly identified a wholly owned subsidiary rather than the parent
corporation as the principal debtor. A puzzling consequence of this situation is that the
trustee waived this defect. The record indicates that a correct financing statement was
subsequently filed. However, the date of this filing did not appear. Professor Mahon has
suggested that the decision might have been made on narrower grounds without infringing
on the province of Article 9:
Whatever the actual, unstated facts, one wishes that a decision which
"recognize[s] the importance of not embroidering qualifications on the UCC's
scheme of notice filing" had not at the same time itself suggested but failed to
dispel the possibility that the carefully thought-out existing requirements were
not satisfied.
Id. at 3, col. 1 (quoting In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 871 (2d Cir. 1976)).
See also In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 868 n.1. (2d Cir. 1976). U.C.C. §
9-402(8) provides relief for "minor errors which are not seriously misleading." In the
instant case, the court might have determined that appellants' misidentification of the
debtor was not a "minor" error. The consequence of such a determination might have been
failure of appellant to become perfected before the date of bankruptcy. Then, according
to U.C.C. § 9-301 and § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)(1953), the trustee
in bankruptcy would take priority. If the correct financing statement was filed within four
months of the bankruptcy, a voidable preference may have existed pursuant to Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1968), again giving the trustee priority. Thus the court
might have reached the same ultimate decision without altering the existing Article 9
filing requirements. These possibilities, however, were not discussed by the court.
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authority in any decision construing Article 9 which would even
suggest that such additional information be included. 6 5
The theory of notice filing is that it permits subsequent creditors to determine from the financing statement whether certain
assets are encumbered. This simply puts the searcher on notice
and instructs him where to look for further information.66 The
potential creditor can then make a rational decision whether to
extend credit.
The whole thrust of Article 9 is to "provide a simple and
unified structure within which the immense variety of presentday secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost
and with greater certainty. 6 7 Many courts have emphasized the
underlying purpose and intent of the U.C.C. notice filing requirement.6 They have consistently stressed simplicity, flexibility,
and certainty. 69 As Judge Mulligan so aptly articulated in his
dissent: "Any subsequent creditor was clearly alerted to the...
stock repurchase agreement giving rise to the security interest. It
was an obvious lead to the underlying transaction which would
hardly require the investigative talents of a Sherlock Holmes or
Inspector Maigret to unearth."70 The majority opinion leads one
to speculate what future courts will view as "normal valid com65. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 872 (2d Cir. 1976).
66. 1 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. (Matthew Bender) § 6.041] n.99 (1976): "[The primary object of filing is to give the file searcher enough leads to permit him to learn more
specific matters through his own inquiries." See 1 C. GiMoP, SEcuRrry INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 468-70 (1965). The courts have also recognized this principle. In Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 643, 645, 300
N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (2d Dep't 1969), the court stated: "The purpose of a notice-filing
statute is to give protection to a creditor by furnishing to others intending to enter into a
transaction with the debtor a starting point for investigation which will result in fair
warning concerning the transaction contemplated. . . ...
See also In re Excel Stores, Inc.,
341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Gilchrist Co., 403 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re
Grandmont, 310 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1970); John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr.
Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't 1970); In re Pasco Sales Co., Inc.,
77 Misc. 2d 724, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974); Marine Midland Bank
v. Conerty Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 311, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1974); Sunshine v. Sunray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d
937 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970); Bank of Utica v. Smith Richfield Springs, Inc., 58
Misc. 2d 113, 294 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1968).
67. U.C.C. § 9-101 (official comment).
68. See note 66 supra.
69. In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965); John Deere Co. v. William
C. Pahl Constr. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't 1970); Beneficial
Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 643, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884 (2d
Dep't 1969).
70. In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 873 (2d Cir. 1976).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

67

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

mercial transactions"7 and hence what further filing requirements will be engrafted on Article 9.
To reach a result in harmony with the policies underlying the
Uniform Commercial Code, the majority in Flying Mailmen
should have examined several other considerations. For example,
the purpose of restricting corporate stock repurchases is to prevent fraudulent conveyances of assets which would defeat the
rights of creditors."2 This has been an established principle since
the inception of the common law "no prejudice" rule. There was
not even a hint of fraud in Flying Mailmen. The subsequent
creditors had every opportunity to ascertain the nature of the
underlying transaction. Appellant should not have been penalized for the carelessness of the subsequent creditors. Furthermore, the court should not have ignored appellant's good faith
reliance on Article 9. The majority, however, found "no policy
reason to strain to hold that the mere filing of a financing statement affording no indication that the agreement secured is a
'7 3
stock repurchase agreement will suffice.
The notice parameter should have been left to Article 9.
There is no authority in the U.C.C. or in any decision to justify
the Flying Mailmen aberration of section 9-402. Moreover, considering appellant's reasonable reliance on the Code, the court's
decision is patently unjust. There are many ways that a secured
creditor can fail to become perfected. 4 This case adds one more.
Bruce R. Thaw
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 870.
See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
In re Flying Mailmen Serv., Inc., 539 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1976).
J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-22, at 862 (1972).
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